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After three decades of Intense United States international involve-
ment, a complex community of semi-autonomous governmental agencies has
evolved to plan, implement and operate America's foreign affairs. The
past ten years have seen several attempts to unify policymaking machin-
ery. This thesis proposes a general model for Presidential foreign
policymaking through the Department of State. Historical aspects of the
problem are briefly described, followed by an analysis of the current
CASP and PARA approaches to foreign affairs planning, decisionmaking,
resource management and review. The author then proposes a conceptual
model based on essential characteristics of foreign affairs policymaking,
which are fashioned into a dynamic four-stage system for substantive
management. The thesis concludes with consideration of the measurement
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The idea for a thesis on how modern management concepts and analyt-
ical methods might best be applied to the conduct of American foreign
policy first came to the author when he was an intern in the Office of
the Secretary of State. While a candidate for advanced degrees in both
public administration and operations research, he had the opportunity to
investigate at close hand the extent to which systems management,
analytical decisionmaking and program budgeting were being used in the
Department of State. As a result of that experience, this researcher
decided that such a thesis could be a useful contribution to the Depart-
ment' s efforts at management reform. The thesis should offer a general
model for (1) the substantive management of foreign policy and (2) the
system for its design, development and control. This type of framework
is necessary, in the author's opinion, before others can successfully
introduce specific analytical methodologies, such as the current "Policy
Analysis and Resource Allocation" approach.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze and evaluate current con-
cepts of policy formulation and analysis, determine what structural
characteristics are essential to policymaking in foreign affairs, and
The writer served as a member of the Secretary's Planning and
Coordination Staff in May and June of 1971, working primarily on an
assessment of the PARA (Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation) system
used by regional bureaus. This internship was followed by return visits
in November 1971 and January 1972 as a consultant to the newly formed
Methods and Systems Staff.
p
The PARA system is discussed in detail in Chapter II.

develop these characteristics into a general model of a proposed
policymaking process. The writer begins by defining a number of terms
used throughout the thesis. He then presents the assumptions underlying
the analysis of policy or substantive management issues and the design
of a general model. The first chapter includes sufficient background
and history necessary for a layman to understand the problem of manage-
ment reform in the Department. It is admitted, however, that the author
is writing primarily for persons engaged in designing and developing
policy analysis and resource allocation methods at the Department of
State as well as his colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School who
are studying the application of operations research and systems analysis
to national security affairs and public policymaking generally.
The second chapter examines current concepts of policy analysis
and describes several attenpts at "programming" foreign affairs. Primary
attention is given the PARA (Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation)
system concept and the CASP (Country Analysis and Strategy Paper) meth-
odology. The state-of-the-art is examined and major strengths and
short-comings determined.
Chapter III presents those characteristics the writer considers
essential to any desirable policymaking process for the conduct of
America's foreign affairs. Seven essential characteristics of a desir-
able policymaking system are detailed.
Chapter IV is in three parts. In the first the writer proposes a
model for the policymaking process. This is followed by critique
relating the model to the existing environment. The third part addresses
how public officials may measure policy effectiveness in foreign affairs
applications.

B. DEFINITION OF TERMS
There are a number of terms used throughout this presentation which
require precise definition, because too much ambiguity is attached to
them in everyday usage. These terms will be defined here for the purpose
of this thesis.
Policy : An understanding by members of a group that makes the actions
of each member more predictable to other members. Policy is
a guide for making decisions
.
3
Policy Decision : A decision that sets a precedent and provides some
guide for decisionmaking in the future.
Policymaking : The making of policy decisions.
Goals : Desired conditions that are achievable only in an extended
time frame, that is, five years or more.
Objectives : Conditions that are specific milestones in the attainment
of goals and are achievable In the short term, e.g., one or
two years.
Program : An explicit set of steps to be taken in order to achieve all
or part of an objective.
5
Operations : Constrained, routinized set of tasks that are performed in
carrying-out an established program.
Planning : The process by which a manager looks to the future and
discovers alternative courses (goals, objectives, programs)
open to him.k
Implementation : The process of selecting preferred programs; develop-
ing, staffing and initiating their activities, and carrying
them to the point when they can be operated routinely.
Foreign Affairs Community : Those departments, agencies, bureaus and
other elements of the U.S. Government engaged in the conduct
of foreign policy or international activities. The principal
Joseph L. Massie, Essentials of Management , (Englewood Cliffs:










bodies in this "community" are: the Departments of State,
Defense, Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture; the Central
Intelligence Agency; the Agency for International Development;
the U.S. Information Agency; the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and the Peace Corps.
Functional Fields : Specialized fields that a Foreign Service Officer
may enter: political-military, economic-commercial, intelligence
and research, consular or administrative.
Substantive Fields : The two most prestigious and generalist fields of
political and general economic affairs are considered the
policy generating or "substantive" areas by most FS0s.7
Systems Analysis : A systematic approach to helping a decisionmaker
choose among courses of action by investigating his full
problem, searching out objectives and alternatives, and com-
paring them in the light of their consequences; it employs an
appropriate framework—in so far as possible analytic—to bring
expert judgment and intuition to bear on the problem.
8
C. ASSUMPTIONS
There are assumptions underlying the analysis and conclusions con-
tained in this thesis. The writer has identified the following:
1. The scope of foreign affairs and its policymaking is the whole
of the U.S. Government's international activities, except for the uni-
fied commands and other Presidentially excluded military activities.
2. The President, acting through his Secretary of State, should
direct, supervise and control all of the U.S. Government's foreign affairs,
3. The U.S. Government's foreign affairs and its policymaking are
composed of numerous overlapping, yet independent, systems which need to
be integrated centrally; such system integration requires management by
the Secretary of State of policy formulation and resource allocation, as
well as his supervision of implementation and control of operations.
' John E. Harr, The Professional Diplomat , (Princeton: The Prince-
ton University Press) 19&9, p. 1^1.
o
E. S. Quade, "Systems Analysis and Policy Planning," in E. S.'
Quade and W. I. Boucher, eds., Systems Analysis and Policy Planning
(Santa Monica: The PAND Corporation) 1968, p. 2.
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4. The management of foreign affairs, in both substantive stages
and system design, would benefit substantially from the use of systematic
analysis, including quantitative and economic reasoning.
D. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1. The Context
When a notable former Secretary of State feels compelled to
write that "...the role, power and prestige of the Secretary and Depart-
ment of State in the conduct of foreign affairs have steadily declined,"
the writer believes that an examination of the institution, and the
environment in which it operates, is in order.
It is the writer's belief that the late Secretary's assessment
is accurate, and that much of the difficulty stems from continued efforts
to employ nineteenth-century methods of diplomacy and foreign affairs
management to a world situation that has far outdistanced these methods.
With the advent of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the
character of U.S. foreign relations changed from traditional isolation-
ism to deep involvement in world affairs; yet the
...Body of professional diplomats, the Foreign Service
Officer corps, remained essentially unchanged. It manned
none of the new functions ... it would have been impossible
for it to do so in such a short time with its normal method
of recruitment from the bottom.-*-*-1
Twenty-five years later, we are in the midst of a period which
John Harr describes as "revolutionary" in world affairs, one in which
"Crises are endemic." Professor Charles McClelland hypothesizes
Dean Acheson, "The Eclipse of the State Department," Foreign
Affairs
,
July 1971, p. 593-






, pp. 28, 31.
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that the demands for more effective handling of U.S. foreign relations
is accentuated by burgeoning domestic difficulties, which he attributes
to "accelerating modernization."
Despite the accumulation of wealth and power, all the modern-
ized countries and not only the United States, have been find-
ing that the recent growth in the size, scope and complexity
of their domestic activities has occurred at a faster rate
than the increases in collective organizational ability to steer
these activities in desired directions. Standard procedures for
handling many problems in society appear to have become too slow,
too fragmented, and too expensive. .. .Accompanying these effects
is an increase in a phenomenon that should be called "Societal
Metabolism"—the more modernized societies simply live more
and faster than the less modernized societies. The most
modernized societies encounter so many emergency situations
that government by crisis threatens to become a permanent
condition. 12
Professor McCLelland goes on to say that "In foreign affairs the basic
needs are to reduce the saliency of international politics and to
maximize efforts to avert confrontations and crises and to attenuate
conflicts." 13
The demands of the current environment on policymaking are
sumnarized by Yehezkel Dror, one of the foremost proponents of a new
discipline of "policy science."
One conclusion seems inescapable: the problems faced
even now by modern society, to say nothing of the problems
scientific progress and social evolution will raise in the
foreseeable future, require very high-quality public policy-
making for even minimally satisfactory solutions."
to
Charles A. McClelland, et. al. "The Management and Analysis of
International Event Data: A Computerized System for Monitoring and
Projecting Event Flows," report prepared for ARPA/ONR contract #N000l4-






Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined , (San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Company) 1968, p. 6.
13

It is the author's belief that the situation described above
places the U.S. President in the position of great need for an effec-
tive, responsive foreign affairs bureaucracy."' The President alone has
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone
15
negotiates.'" Over the past decade, three presidents have consis-
tently tried to gain the necessary responsiveness from the foreign
affairs community, and have encouraged the Department of State to take
charge and coordinate the many agencies' efforts. It is the writer's
opinion that failure in these efforts has forced the President to adopt
the less-desirable alternative of surrounding himself with a range of
advisors and experts, assembled in groups compact enough to give the
desired responsiveness. The writer recognizes the current National
Security Council (NSC) as the most advanced of such presidential
advisory systems, which, as organized today, Institutionalizes the
President ' s alternative to Departmental leadership and multi-agency
participative management.
2. The Nixon NSC
In order to assess the role, power and influence of the Depart-
ment of State today, vis a vis the NSC apparatus, the reader should
compare both institutions over time. President Eisenhower, who created
a most elaborate NSC system, relied primarily on his Secretary of State
15





for the direction of foreign affairs while delegating to the Under Secre-
17
tary operational coordination. President Kennedy virtually disassem-
bled the NSC system, retaining the Office of Assistant to the President
-1 o
for National Security Affairs (NSA) as a personal staff. He exhorted
the Secretary of State to take charge of the foreign affairs community,
19but gave little more executive attention to the matter. President
Johnson continued using the Office of Assistant to the President for
NSA in the same manner, but sought even more energetically ways for the
Secretary of State and the Department to exercise hegemony over the
20
semi-autonomous foreign affairs agencies. Under Johnson's direction,
General Maxwell D. Taylor drafted NSAM-3^1 (National Security Action
Memorandum), which devised a policy review structure that weighed
heavily in State's favor; but the Department did not seize the oppor-
21
tunity presented, and the result, in the author's opinion, was the
revised NSC.
17
Robert Cutler, "The National Security Council Under President
Eisenhower," in Henry M. Jackson, ed. , The National Security Council
,
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers) 19^5, pp. 111-139-
-i o
Good accounts of the Kennedy approach to foreign policy manage-
ment may be found in: Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation ; Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days ; Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy .
1
Ibid
. , pp. 380-387..*-.^-.-^ > ft" _<~~ _-~i •
Harr, op . cit
. , pp. 27-28.
21
The two most comprehensive accounts of the Johnson administra-
tion efforts to restructure the foreign affairs community are found
in: John Franklin Compbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory ; and
Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership .
15

On February 7, 1969 in a formal White House announcement, the
22
revised structure, role and staff of the NSC were outlined. This
instruction rescinded the Johnson system for high level policy review,
outlined in NSAM-3^1 (4 March 1966).
The Senior Interdepartmental Group/Interdepartmental Regional
Group hierarchy was replaced with an organization tightly controlled by
the new Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry
Kissinger, and geared to support exactly that advisory capacity.
The original formal structure provided for two standing com-
mittees: the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, chaired by the Under
Secretary of State and tasked with handling primarily operational
matters; and the NSC Senior Review Group (SRG), chaired by Henry
Kissinger and tasked with assigning and giving formal approval to all
NSC study memoranda. Also in the formal structure are six Interdepart-
mental Groups (IG's, formerly Interdepartmental Regional Groups under
NSAM-3^1), one for each of the State Department's five geographic regions
and one for political-military affairs, each chaired by the appropriate
Assistant Secretary of State.
Great flexibility is given to the system through the provision
for NSC Ad Hoc Groups, which may be appointed by the President to handle
specific issues, including those crossing regional bounds. Some of the
ad hoc groups appear to have transcended the standing committees in
importance. The current situation shows five ad hoc groups, with four
apparantly taking permanent status at the level of the Senior Review
22
Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International
Operations, committee print, "The National Security Council: new




Group. J These five are: (1) the Verification Panel, charged with pro-
viding the sensitive high-priority analysis for the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT); (2) the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG),
chaired by Kissinger and tasked with providing the command and control
function necessary in cases of sudden international crises or national
emergencies; (3) the Vietnam Special Studies Group, chaired by a Kissin-
ger staff senior analyst who insures that no White House questions
regarding Vietnam are left unanswered; (4) the Defense Programs Review
Committee, chaired by Kissinger and designated to align defense expen-
ditures with foreign policy objectives; and (5) the newest .element
added in November 1971, the Intelligence Committee, chaired again by
Kissinger to coordinate efforts among the numerous separate elements
of the intelligence community. To assist Dr. Kissinger, there are in
excess of 120 professionals and administrative people who provide staff
for regional and functional tasks, program analysis and net assessment.
Prom the above description, it would appear to the writer that
little U.S. foreign policymaking machinery is left unsupervised by the NSC,
and much of it is incorporated within its structure. The major tool
at the disposal of the NSC is the National Security Study Memorandum
(NSSM) , an instruction soliciting a detailed written response to a
specified set of study questions, the product of which must be approved
by the appropriate IG and then the SRG or other designated comparable
2"5
John Leacacos, "Kissinger's Apparat," Foreign Policy 5 No. 5 }






body before being submitted to the President. "Harvard professor that
he is, he [Kissinger] made the bureaucrats write theses, and proved to
be a tough grader. He rated many of the early NSC studies no better
25than 'C—barely passing."
The requirement for detail review of each NSSM and the option
to return those found unacceptable for reworking are considered by the
writer to be inherent strengths of the current NSC system; it attempts
to locate all feasible options available in a particular policy issue.
Concomitant with these strengths are two of the major weaknesses the
writer sees in the current approach, the generation of a massive volume
of paper and the broad range of issues given one man and his relatively
small staff to monitor, develop options and coordinate actions.
The need would seem rather to go beyond this, to have
other officials at key places in the foreign affairs govern-
ment who are responsive to the President's priorities. .. .And
this is precisely what the Nixon system has failed to do. It
has not built centers of strength responsive to the President
in other parts of the foreign affairs government .26
In the writer's opinion, the breadth and depth of a man's interests
cannot be so wide and uniform that he concentrates on every issue with
the same interest and competance. One result of the existing situation
is that the key man's biases have already been applied to the information
flow, before the Chief Executive is allowed to apply his own. In many
ways the present NSC system is the most efficient advisory apparatus









3. The AFSA Coup
For eight years under President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles,
the prevailing attitude about the management of foreign affairs in the
Department of State had been quite reactionary at best. Efforts were
directed toward exorcising every operational and implementive facet of
27
foreign affairs. The Department was to concentrate on "policy," leav-
ing the conduct of operations to others. "Others" sprang up in abun-
dance, with nearly 50 governmental entities not only involved in foreign
affairs by 1961, but placing elements abroad. At the "Bay of Pigs"
the Kennedy administration learned painfully but quickly the problems
of coordinating and controlling disparate agencies involved in carrying-
29
out the foreign policy activities of the United States. The reaction
30 31
was swift; the President by Executive Order, letters and admonitions
asked the Department and Foreign Service to take back the direction and
supervision of America's foreign affairs. The management revolution
came to Washington, swept through the Pentagon, but in the author's
opinion stalled at the Department of State.
The junior FSO entering the Department over the past decade was
a new breed, one that questioned the traditional values and methods of
the FOreign Service, and was concerned that his chosen profession was
27
' Mosher and Harr, op. cit ., p. 17-
28
Ibid
. , pp. 12-16.
29
Schlesinger, op. cit .
3° Executive Order abolishing the Operations Coordinating Board
(OCB), 19 February 1961.
31
Kennedy letter to the ambassadors, 29 May 196l, affirming their
control over all agencies in their countries.
19

increasingly criticized as being archaic. In 1966 many of the younger
officers began to examine some of these problems through a group called
the Junior Foreign Service Officer's Club. Dubbed the "young Turks,"
their presence soon became known, and their efforts and ideas started
to gain support from some of the middle-grade and senior officers in
the Department.
In 1967 , the JFSOC joined forces with a group of activist
middle-grade FSO's, and staged what has come to be known as the "AFSA
coup." The American Foreign Service Association, a bulwark of tradi-
tionalism, became the target of a well-planned political campaign that
found its way Into every Foreign Service post around the world. The
result was an overwhelming victory for the activists and their slate
of candidates, transforming AFSA into the focal point for the progres-
sive movement in the Foreign Service.
Immediately following their election in the fall of 1967, the
Board of Directors of AFSA mobilized a study group composed of eight
subcommittees assigned to specific projects. The subjects ranged from
personnel and career management problems to the broader area of foreign
affairs management, including a study of State Department "Organization
and Leadership: and an investigation of possible applications of "Tech-
nology and Systems Analysis." Many of the recommendations stated in
op












the final AFSA report-3 were reaffirmations of the results of earlier
studies directed by Christian Herter and Charles J. Hitch; others how-
ever, were radical departures from the traditional role and concepts
long held in the Foreign Service. Some of these recommendations and
comments were:
...appointment of a "general managern as number three officer,
to be called either Executive Under Secretary or Permanent Under
Secretary
.
All substantive officers should acquire a general understanding
of computer operations and systems analysis techniques....
A few substantive officers should be extensively trained in
these techniques so that they can serve as liaison between the
outside experts who have had little experience in foreign affairs
and the experienced foreign affairs officers who have little
knowledge of the technical fields of computers and systems
analysis.
The coordination responsibility in policy direction also in-
volves... the pulling together of courses of action and resource
allocations for many programs in pursuit of overall objectives.
The State Department should do more and better planning.
Without effective management, the President cannot have the
confidence in the Department that is necessary if it is to be
utilized effectively.
The effect of the AFSA studies was decidedly positive, gener-
ating a wave of interest and desire for reform from within the Depart-
ment. V/hen the incoming Nixon administration rescinded NSAM-3^1 and
created the strong NSC staff, soon termed the "pocket State Department"
by the press, these pressures for reform grew in intensity. Early in
3
"Toward a Modern Diplomacy," published as Part Two of the November
1968 Foreign Service Journal .






1970, William B. Macomber, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administra-
tion, initiated a series of studies under the direction of thirteen
task forces, each composed of Department personnel and instructed to
investigate thoroughly, and make recommendations on, a particular area
of management reform within State. The results of these task force
reports were compiled in a document over 600 pages long and containing
505 specific recommendations. Several of the recommendations were
adopted immediately, and a schedule was developed for further study
and implementation of the remainder. As of January 1972, approximately
JJ00 of the task force recommendations either had taken effect or been
40
approved for implementation.
The reports of Task Forces XI, XII, and XIII provided precepts
and models for foreign affairs management, including policymaking,
resource allocation, implementation and evaluation, and gave birth to the
acronym: "PARA," A "Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation" system
was to become the Department ' s answer to the Defense Department ' s "PPBS"
(Planning, Programming, Budgeting System) , which was Presidentially
prescribed in 1965 for the Executive Branch, but ignored by policy-
41
oriented officers in the Department.
•5Q
^
"Diplomacy for the 70' s: A Program of Management Reform for
the Department of State," (Washington: USGPO) December, 1970.
Remarks by William B. Macomber, "Change in Foggy Bottom: An
Anniversary Report," Department of State Press Release No. 22, dtd.
26 January 1972.
President Johnson announced that PPBS would be installed govern-
ment-wide on 25 August 1965. Tiiis was followed on 12 October by Bureau
of the Budget Bulletin No. 66-3, the basic implementing directive.
22

II. PARA AND CASP: CONCEPTS AND DEVELOPMENT
A. THE PARA CONCEPT
"Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation" (PARA) first appeared in
the Task Force XI report on "Roles and Functions of Diplomatic Missions,"
where the members felt they could "...devise a methodology to improve
and clarify policy formulation and incorporate the whole foreign affairs
system into a related resource allocation system." Nine points were
outlined as "essential features" of such a system. ^
1. It must be based firmly on an agreed inventory of U.S.
interests abroad which at least attempts to be all inclusive....
2. Guidance on U.S. interests and policy should be Washington
initiated, and field response should propose programs and
allocations needed to implement policy.
3. It must include a rigorous analytical process that would
be more or less standard....
4. It should link programs to interests and describe programs
in a fashion that permits comparison between countries and
regions
.
5. The design must be such that the system can evolve, even-
tually permitting analysis of the cost/benefit type.
6. The system must yield program and cost data that are com-
parable between countries and regions and which can be trans-
lated into budget figures readily.
7. Both the policy analysis information and the program data
should be prepared for automated data processing. . .
.
8. The System must function within an institutional structure
providing both independent analytical capability located at
the proper points in the structure and systematic review pro-
cedures at the appropriate levels insuring that important
issues are surfaced and decisions respecting them made.
42




9. The system must be flexible enough to take into account
changes in the importance of U.S. interests or in conditions
in the foreign country.
Three recommendations regarding design and implementation of a PARA
system were submitted by Task Force XI. The first two together in-
corporated the nine points stated above into a proposed "system;" the
third recommended using the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs as a lab-
oratory for developing such a system, based on its experience with the
Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP). This brief introduction
to PARA further referenced the Task Force XIII report as a source of
amplification of system design, and concluded with a disclaimer designed
to allay any fears of "automated decisionmaking," which might have been
aroused among elements of the non-technical FSO corps.
The PARA system. ..is designed to be helpful. It is not
expected to replace human beings in any way. Judgment remains
the essential element in determining options. The system is
aimed at giving the decisionmaker a broader grasp of the issues
and a sense of having considered all relevant factors .^
The Task Force XIII report on "Management Tools" did not in fact
make any reference to PARA, yet many of the ideas presented by Task
Force XI were discussed in a somewhat loose, functional listing of
elements that would compose their desired global/regional substantive
management system. For example:
We have isolated four basic functions which together make
up the Department's role in the foreign policy process: (1) it
makes decisions; (2) it manages its own resources; (3) it exer-
cises leadership in the foreign affairs community; and (4) it







The Department must exercise its leadership role in the
foreign affairs community in a number of ways: it must contribute
to the interagency formulation of foreign policy; it must provide
other agencies involved in foreign affairs with policy guidance;
and it should coordinate the implementation of foreign policy
decisions.
. . . top structure at the Department level and top structure at
the bureau level should include: built-in facilities for expli-
cit consideration of alternative course of action. . .appraisal
and review of ongoing policies; interagency coordination and
planning; and linking of bureau, departmental, and other agency
resources to policy and ultimately to national interests.
Country plans are a starting point; these should be expanded
into regional plans, and finally into a global plan. These
plans should be used to establish budget guidelines and prior-
ities.
One particularly interesting point found throughout the Task Force
XIII report was its explicit recognition of the revised NSC system as
a permanent component of any management structure to be devised. This
is not to say that the task force totally agreed with the new role of
the White House staff. On the contrary, alterations within State of
structures, functions and staff relationships were recommended in order
to enhance the Department ' s role within the NSC environment . The task
force particularly disagreed with the "unrealistic and potentially dis-
ruptive" process by which reports from the IG staffs pass directly to
the NSC Senior Review Group without going through the Secretariat for
approval, and the fact that the Under Secretaries' Committee has no
direct relationship with the IG's. The NSC system was accepted as a
permanent element in the Executive Branch, however, and the following
assumptions were made explicit:
1. Our basic foreign policy analysis and decisionmaking system
will be based on interagency mechanisms serving the President,
particularly the NSC system;
2. In the interagency process of formulating foreign policy
the Department will play a major role and will exercise leader-
ship on a broad range of policy issues;
25

3. The Department will have a key role in implementing foreign
policy decisions, and will have the primary role in the conduct
of diplomacy. "
After recognizing the fragmented role played by the "seventh floor" ?
in managing the activities of the Department and the foreign' affairs
community, Task Force XIII made a number of recommendations concerning
the four functions described earlier as the Department's role in the
foreign policy process. In order to tie together their recommendations,
the group described an "envisioned system," suggesting a management
hierarchy that would use the full efforts and resources of the Depart-
ment to maintain effective control of the foreign policy process.
Constructed on three levels of decisionmaking, the model provided for
a Strategic Management Center at the Department level, Bureau Management
Centers at the regional /functional level, with country/office directors
at the lowest level remaining essentially unchanged. The enhanced
management capability at the seventh floor was advocated in order to
facilitate the installation of a global planning and resource alloca-
tion system, such as a PARA. The "envisioned system" perceived the
NSC in much more of a watchdog and appellate capacity, with the initia-
tive for planning and operational control relinquished to the Department.
Using its initiative, the Department would issue global planning guidance
to be passed down through the regional or functional bureaus to the
country offices and missions, triggering at that "working level" a




^7 The seventh floor is the location of the Secretariat and the offices
of most senior Department personnel and their staffs, hence a physical
position in the hierarchy.
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planning documents to pass back up the line and surface key policy
issues for decisionmakers to consider, while neatly relating objectives
and programs to concomitant resources.
Such was PARA: acronym, analytic methodology, check list of "essen-
tial features," and system concept with iterative cycles from strategic
planning to implementation and operation of America's official inter-
national activities. Prom experience on the Department's Planning
and Coordination Staff and through research into the PARA concepts
held by the regional bureaus, this writer feels that little has been
achieved to date in developing the conceptual framework of PARA; and
what has been done either was unavailable to the bureaus or unsought
by them.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Organization and Management
until summer 1971, Thomas Stern, was first directed to coordinate the
PARA effort throughout the Department. In an interview with this
writer on 20 May 1971, Mr. Stern outlined the three factors governing
the current approach toward development of a PARA system.
First, Mr. Stern explained that the Department's experiences with
country programming and PPBS had been quite negative, no small part of
which was due to the rigidity of the various approaches in their efforts
to program foreign affairs. Therefore, the philosophy this time was to
grant the regional bureaus a free hand to develop the approach they
felt most beneficial to them. Great care must be taken not to stifle
creativity or breed instant resistance by forcing conformity to a





Secondly, a basic assumption underlying the above approach is the
idea that a single system embracing all regional areas cannot be imple-
mented in the near future. Mr. Stern's principal example was the
individual country orientation of the CASP (Country Analysis and
Strategy Paper) system used throughout Latin America. He explained
that although the individual country papers work well in that regional
environment, such would not be the case in Europe. Regional political,
military and economic alignments in Europe constrain country policies
to a degree not found in Latin America, necessitating more of a region-
ally oriented approach to PARA.
Finally, Mr. Stern asserted that rigid processes and formal meth-
odologies would inhibit the individual FSO's contribution of insights
and values while producing additional bureaucratic layers and delay.
In this writer's opinion, there are sociological and psychological
factors existing within the Department that are more germane to Mr.
Stern's acceptance of three "governing factors" than the conditions
mentioned immediately above. Insight into these conditions may be
obtained from: Chris Argyris, "Some Causes of Organizational Ineffec-
tiveness within the Department of State;" Mosher and Harr, Programming
Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership ; and John E. Harr, The Professional
Diplomat . It suffices to say that under existing conditions, Mr. Stern
had few real alternatives.
There is one staff organization within the Department in an ideal
position to influence the conceptual framework of the PARA, and that
is the Planning and Coordination Staff. From the writer's experience
as a member, the planning function on this staff is almost totally
usurped in supporting NSC study requirements; it is only fair to say
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that individual members had little time, even given the inclination,
to carry-out such a project. Several members, notably V. Rodger Digilio
and Fisher Howe before him, did contribute some very thoughtful and
constructive studies in the attempts to develop a process for making
PARA operational, but their papers were not widely circulated outside
the staff.
Where this background leads is to the importance of the one document
that provided the only operational model available to the Department.
That document is the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP), written
in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs since 1966. The CASP during
1971 underwent a change in methodology to a highly formalized logic
structure; and the reader will be introduced to this second generation
model, CASP II. A critical look at the CASP II is necessary in order
to evaluate the extent to which it fulfills the desired criteria for
PARA.
B. THE CASP AS A MODEL
1. What is CASP?
In the fall of 1966 Lincoln Gordon, while Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs (ARA), succeeded in converting the
remains of a discredited "Comprehensive Country Programming System"
(CCPS) into the first CASP for each of the Latin American states. The
attempt was the first time a regional bureau sought to establish a
18
planning, programming and budgeting system. The Bureau was unique
within the Department, however, because both Lincoln Gordon and Edwin
M. Martin before him had experience and interest in management and
^8 Mosher ana Harr, op. clt ., p. 189,
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economic affairs. '° They had provided most of the test countries for
the earlier CCPS and they were accustomed to the integration of State
and AID (Agency for International Development) activities within one
Bureau.
The first CASP products were country-originated, country-oriented
documents, borrowing the better features of the CCPS and FAPS^O systems
.
The first CASPS were not a very uniform product, because the quality
depended to a great extent on the interest and enthusiasm of the Ambas-
sador and/or Country Team. The desired document was to be a five-year
projection of general and specific U.S. objectives in a country, a
related division of programs on an inter-agency basis, and concomitant
costs. The analyses done were narrative assessments, which, when approved
by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) became a statement of U.S. foreign
policy. Each year the CASP process was evaluated and refined until
finally, in late 1970, the Assistant Secretary for ARA, Charles A. Meyer,
decided to incorporate the major "lessons-learned" into a revised, more
SIformalized structure on an experimental basis. Four countries were
selected for the CASP II experiment: Panama, Venezuela, Guatemala and
Ecuador. By August 1971, these four pilot products were completed,
and the decision was made to implement CASP II throughout Latin America.
49
Ibid.
, pp. 38-^0, 188-189.
50 An excellent description and evaluation of these systems may be
found in Mosher and Harr ' s Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs
Leadership .
51 This information was obtained in interviews and discussions with
ARA/IG staff members during the writer's internship.
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2. The CASP Methodology
With CASP II now standard in ARA, its approach must be evaluated
as a model for a global PARA system. One point from which to take a
critical look at the CASP is the perspective of those who designed the
system.
The CASP... is a country-oriented planning document for U.S.
agencies in Latin America. As such, it examines U.S. inter-
ests in Latin American countries and sets objectives the U.S.
should achieve to preserve and advance those interests. It
serves to identify issues likely to arise in the planning
period, to mark out directions for U.S. policy, and to pro-
vide gross estimates of future resource requirements which
time and experience will serve to refine.
The CASP is not a detailed programming document, nor a
comprehensive exercise in personnel planning .... Nor is the
CASP an exercise in contingency planning. It looks to the
future, describes the situation most likely to exist in the
planning period and plans for that situation only. 52
As for the time period, CASP II looks only two years ahead for
planning: the "near term" fiscal year (PY1), commencing on 1 July
following CASP preparation, and the "far term" fiscal year(FY2) which
immediately follows. Planning for the CASP begins with the issuance
of guidance approximately 18 months prior to FY 1. It is intended that
the document should be completed and approved within 12 months, that is,
in time to start the planning for FY 2 as neat1 term.
The greatest revision in the CASP II is the establishment of a
rigid system of logic which uses U.S. interests as an input and develops
foreign policy goals, objectives and courses of action. The IG staff
has initiated this process by publishing a generic listing of U.S.
52
"CASP Procedural Guidance," published by the Interdepartmental
Group, ARA, no date, p. 1.
31

























































interests, defined as "...broad areas of national concern toward which
the U.S. has over time and in varying contexts, devoted effort and
resources. "-^ With this listing in hand, the Country Team (CT) is
requested to identify those interests that are applicable to the host
country for the planning period, create related interest statements for
that country, and further partition these into specific areas of
concern within that interest. Detailed step-by-step instructions,
along with a programmed series of forms to complete, are published in
ARA's "CASP Procedural Guidance."
Once U.S. interests are explicitly stated, the CT is supposed
to examine the host country environment and assess how it might affect
each interest. This is carried-out in two steps: first, relevent
environmental indicators are selected; and secondly, the futurity of
each of these conditions is projected to the end of the planning period,
and anticipated consequences assessed.
Indicators are information categories. .. .They elicit infor-
mation about those factors in the environment which bear on
U.S. interests—either affecting their well-being or serving
as an accurate barometer of their condition. 5^
An example of an indicator, constructed for the hypothetical U.S.
interest that a host country not make alliances hostile to the U.S.,
might be: the level of foreign communist government and/or military
presence in the host country. The current condition of the indicator
would be a specific statement of the levels of presence, in numbers
if they are known.
The next step is to identify any challenges to, or opportunities
for U.S. interests. A Challenge might be a direct threat to one or more
53 Ibid., p. 3-
^ Ibid., p. H.
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interests. The output of this exercise is the assignment of a "degree
of concern" for the specific interest, which may be assigned as "high,
medium, low, or none." For interests assigned a "low" or "none," the
analysis stops there. For "high" and "medium," the analysis moves on
to "issue identification."
"An issue is stated in terms of how the U.S. should
plan to meet one or more anticipated challenges to an
interest or' how to take advantage of one or more fore-
casted opportunities to preserve or advance an interest."-^
Usually three or four of these issues will be designated as
major, warranting Washington review. For these major issues, the
Country Team is required to write an explicit issue analysis and
resolution paper; for lesser issues, the inquiry proceeds without
resort to a special paper.
The final step in the new CASP process is the identification
of goals, objectives and courses of action.
. .
.
goals are conditions believed to be achievable in a time
frame extending beyond FY 2.
Objectives are conditions which are likely to be achieved in
a fiscal year, through the conduct of one or more U.S. courses
of action.
. . . courses of action—broad initiatives or steps conducted
by the U.S. so as to arrive at a desired condition within a
fiscal year. 5°
Goals are stated for each issue that is identified. Specific objectives
are selected for each goal and scheduled for achievement within the




56 Ibid., p. 13-
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to achieve each objective, thereby completing the policy analysis portion
of the CASP II.
Remaining is what this writer considers to be the weakest
portion of the CASP—the linkage of the policy analysis flow to the
resources necessary for policy implementation. The cursory system
used in the CASP has three simple parts: first, estimate resource
requirements for each course of action; second, identify already
approved programs in support of this course of action; and third,
identify the new resource requirements. These statements of resource
requirements are then incorporated into a set of summary documents,
and the section on resources, for purposes of the CASP, is completed.
In brief, the new CASP process Invokes formalized logical
reasoning to select foreign policy objectives and courses of action.
Its logic is based conceptually on the assumptions that certain cate-
gories of long-term U.S. interests in foreign countries do exist and
the U.S. has a desire to further these interests through positive
action programs.
It is the opinion of this writer that the aspect of resource
allocation with the CASP has the appearance of an incidental appendage
and is not really a critical part of the analysis. It is evident from
reading the "CASP Procedural Guidance" that neither the scarcity of
resources nor the need for choice among alternatives for the optimal
allocation of resources is explicitly considered critical to the
decisionmaking process. It is evident moreover that no mechanism
relates courses of action to available resources, in order to determine
the feasibility and suggest the preferability of various objectives
or courses of action.
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Next to be considered is how the CASP II might relate to the
proposed PARA concept. Less obvious strengths and weaknesses of the
CASP will be appraised, along with a closer look at some elements of
PARA.
3. CASP and the PARA Concept
For a number of practical reasons, CASP II and the proposed
PARA system are quite similar. It was this writer's experience in
researching PARA at State that the individuals primarily responsible
for development of the CASP also were instrumental for promoting the
PARA concept. Moreover, the CASP was a four-year-old, functioning
system in ARA when the Macomber forces were working hard to develop
a Department-wide concept. If the reader were to refer back to the
nine "essential features" of a PARA system, stated in the first pages
of this chapter, he would note the first four were extracted from
"CASP Guidance," or vice versa . This origin raises two questions
about PARA: is the PARA little more than a super-CASP; and if so, can
it best do the desired job of facilitating strategic planning and
decisionmaking in a global context? A closer look at the CASP is
necessary to answer these questions.
The strengths of the CASP system are impressive when compared
to the void in systematic policy analysis that existed before the
system was Instituted. The CASP is now an established and accepted
process, carried-out on an annual cycle. It draws together into an
integrated effort the executive agencies involved in the conduct of
America's foreign affairs in a given country, particularly those
elements within the Country Team. It requires preparation of a single
document which crosses if not transcends, agency bounds in considering
36

U.S. Foreign policy objectives and courses of action. This process is
usually one of conflict and consensus-building among members of the
Country Team, with major remaining disagreements forwarded for resolu-
tion to a Washington interagency organ, the NSC's [regional] Inter-
department Group (IG) for American Republic Affairs. It is this writer's
opinion that such coordination of executive agency efforts should be
a major goal of any policy management system, and represents an important
breakthrough for the foreign affairs community.
The CASP methodology is well-defined and is uniformly used
throughout the geographic region. It offers opportunities for cross-
country comparisons and makes possible the development of a coherant
regional plan. Additionally, the process facilitates the early identi-
fication of critical policy issues, a task necessary to the goal of
supplanting crisis-management with long-range planning and regional
choices among alternatives.
The greatest strength of the CASP, however, is in concept
rather than in the execution. Two of its major shortcomings, viewed
57in terms of the needs of a global PARA, are timing and inflexibility.
The CASP process begins 18 months before the start of the execution
period, and the document is in final form at least six months before
it takes effect. The consensus required for successful passage through
drafting and reviewing demands much time and energy, and no up-dating
processes are integrated into the system. Consequently, a potential
user is given a plan that is at best six months out-of-date when it
57 These two elements were cited frequently in interagency interviews
conducted by Bendix Aerospace Systems Division analysts who were working
under a contract to evaluate the CASP. Excerpts from these interviews
were published in a draft working paper, not for quotation.
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first comes into effect. It may contain assumptions about a situation
that may be more than a year old. Today's world political situation
is too dynamic for a planning system unable to accomodate rapid changes
in assumptions, objectives and courses of action, if not in ultimate
goals. A government can be deposed and replaced in hours; broad
changes may be effected rapidly in a country's environment, which
would necessitate major revisions in objectives, programs and resource
allocations. Any cyclical planning system that does not incorporate
a means for rapid review and update risks obsolescence for its planning.
A flexible review and update capability for country and regional
planning would, in this writer's opinion, solve a major manpower problem
posed by the CASP. The annual writing of lengthy and complex country
plans is time-consuming for those involved, and the burden imposed by
such a major annual undertaking is the principal reason for the inflexi-
bility of the process and inviolability of the documents once they are
drafted. A more practical approach would be to make frequent reviews
of the plan's content, in the light of fluctuations in a host country's
environment and U.S. interests, performance under selected courses of
action, and developments that may become critical challenges or oppor-
tunities. Reviews and revisions should be handled either routinely or
given whatever priority the Country Team believes warranted by the
urgency of the situation. The IG would be called to assess and approve
amendments, subject to a system of priorities. Changes would be entered
into the planning document upon approval while unaffected portions of the
basic document would be left unchanged. The CASP would remain current
and useable, yet the work load on both Embassy and IG staffs could be
reduced and stabilized once the system is established.
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Weaknesses in the CASP mentioned above are due to failings
in the conduct of the system design; other weaknesses arise from the
system's limited scope, which does not encompass all the many facets
of the PARA proposal. The discrepencies between the present CASP and
the proposed PARA must be examined.
First, the CASP procedural Guidance states quite clearly that the
CASP is not "...an exercise in contingency planning," designed to meet
change or circumstances. Neither does the CASP offer alternative courses
of action designed to achieve approximately the same objective within a
similar environment. Both contingencies for probable environmental
change and alternatives within a fixed environment are necessary to
provide flexibility and choice within a comprehensive management system.
To assume the environment will remain fixed throughout a lengthy course
of action developed to achieve a given objective can only be fallacious
reasoning in a dynamic world environment.
Secondly, planning presupposes that some method exists to weigh
the effectiveness of alternative courses of action. In the CASP, no such
method exists. This writer believes that in a comprehensive policy
analysis system operating under conditions of limited resources, such
effectiveness measures are a necessity. The series of reviews mentioned
earlier should be used to spot-check the effectiveness or cost of policies,
programs or operations, and provide the impetus for new decisions when
warranted. Establishment of measures of effectiveness is dealt with at
length in chapters three and four.
The last deficiency to be discussed is not with the CASP, as
such, but a shortcoming of the wider Departmental system in which CASP
operates. It is not the practice of the Secretary or the seventh floor
to suggest preliminary strategic and fiscal guidance for planning
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purposes, followed after a reasonable period by definitive strategic and
fiscal policy, both common procedures in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. The resultant lack of guidance on the likely availability of
resources hampers effective use of cost/benefit analysis as an aid to
choosing among alternative programs. Although a number of objectives
in foreign affairs might be achieved at very little cost in resources by
using diplomatic presence and able negotiation, in the writer's opinion,
this possibility constitutes inadequate justification for failing to
measure and compare those costs that are substantial. Department plan-
ners and decisionmakers must consider the whole of America's foreign
affairs objectives, programs and costs and not sub-optimize at the level
of Department of State objectives, programs and resources. This assump-
tion requires that the Secretary of State be exceptionally aggressive
in the coordination of interagency efforts in foreign affairs, fulfil-
ling the precepts of both President Johnson's NSAM-341 and President
Nixon's message of 7 February 1969- But, as Professor Schelling has
said:
...to put this responsibility on the Secretary of State
is to give him both a means and an obligation to assume
the kind of executive authority that has never, in spite
of executive orders and the logic of ideal government,
either been wholly acceptable to the Department of State
or freely offered to it. This is to put the purse strings
directly into the hands of the Secretary of State with
encouragement tn use them in the executive management of
foreign policy . 58
C. THE ROAD AHEAD
1. Implementing PARA: The First Attempt
5 Thomas C. Schelling, "PPBS And Foreign Affairs," Planning Pro-
gramming Budgeting Inquiry of Senate Subcommittee on National Security
and International Operations (Washington: USGPO), 1970, p. 119-
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One year after the publication of "Diplomacy for the 70 's"
and its call for a PARA system, four regional bureaus were implementing
policy analysis systems. ARA undertook CASP II. The Bureau of European
Affairs (EUR) produced EUROPARA. The Bureau of African Affairs (AF)
came up with "Country Policy Papers." The Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs (EA) inaugerated a country PARA system. Credit must
be given to these bureaus for effort they have begun. Unfortunately, there
is not enough information available at this time to conduct a compre-
hensive and fair analysis of the several systems.
A few general comments about the three newer systems of EUR,
AF and EA are all the writer feels justified to make on the basis of
his brief experience in the Department during 1971. First, no inter-
bureau standardized methodology was established. Consequently, each bureau
developed a more or less unique process. Although each bureau used U.S.
interests as the point of departure, each developed a separate inventory
of interests which differed with the listing used by ARA. Most of the
preparation of each of these PARA documents was carried-out within the
bureaus in Washington, not by the Country Team as the CASP is prepared.
A rigid methodology conducive to analysis was not emphasized, allowing
bureaus to fall back on narrative discussions of interests and objec-
tives. Finally, in this writer's opinion, none of the new PARA approaches
offered a resource summary any more comprehensive or useful than that
used in the CASP.
To conclude, each of the new regional PARA systems is in an
early stage of evolution, and none shows any advantages over CASP II.
There are wide variations in levels of sophistication among all four
approaches, justifying concern that less-than-desirable regional
Hi

systems will become institutionalized and resistant to further innovation.
The writer believes that a degree of standardization is necessary for
global PARA to operate effectively. A key problem that must be faced
soon is finding a way to draw all approaches together into a unified
PARA system.
2. Institutional Resistance and Technical Problems
Based on numerous interviews with Department officials, exposure
to the decisionmaking system and research into recent programming efforts
at State, it is the opinion of this writer that progress toward a com-
prehensive PARA system for the Department will meet resistance primarily
from two courses. First, bureaucratic inertia and lip-service will
continue to cause major delays, if not more serious difficulties, unless
either the Secretary himself or the Under Secretary takes an active
interest and pushes reform. Secondly, the technical problems such as
methodology, measurement, quantification and process must be resolved
early through the Secretary's sponsorship of advanced systems development
and concomitant training in modern management and analytical techniques
for FSO's.
In a memorandum he prepared for the Jackson Subcommittee hear-
ings on PPBS, Thomas Schelling made this incisive statement: "PPBS
can be a splendid tool to help top management make decisions; but there
59has to be a top management that wants to make decisions. Schelling
witnessed this problem first-hand in the State Department during a
period in the spring of 19^7, when first he accepted and later refused






conversations with senior Department officials, Schelling began to
realize that the strong top-level executive support necessary to imple-
ment a major philosophical reorientation toward new management theories
and tools, would not be forthcoming from the Department hierarchy. This
realization was enough to dissuade a Schelling, as it has many other
men over the past decade. It is the writer's opinion that only a very
senior executive, who is willing to take a highly active personal role
as an innovator and can use and support an able staff, can break through
the organizational Inertia and "negotiated settlement" syndrome to make
effective modifications in the system. The fact that the Department of
State, alone among all agencies of the Federal Government, has separated
management and administrative functions from substantive (policy) mat--
ters at the highest levels has limited the availability of command
billets to two: the Secretary and the Under Secretary.
The writer feels that if the problem of executive support were
solved, the time necessary to overcome technical problems could be re-
duced by no less than a factor of five. Tools that could relieve most
of the management information difficulties In the Department already exist,
and could be enployed in six months if acquiring and using them were given
high priority by the Secretary. Country programming methodology does
not benefit from continued tolerance of five divergent regional efforts.
Enough foundation has been laid to support development of a comprehen-
sive system applicable to all regions, given strong executive support for
the task and creation of a seventh floor team with programming and
analytical know-how. Based on a personal investigation of the Depart-
ment's message center, computer facility and related information-handling
systems in January 1972, this writer believes that the ancillary
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capability to automate the storage, retrieval and manipulation of sub-
stantive information and country programming data exists within the
Department now, and needs only a firm hand and a new set of priorities
to activate it.
It is the writer's opinion that all functions described above
could be operational within a year if supported by that one essential
input—strong executive action. If this element is missing, one can
only hope that a small resolute nucleus, committed to the betterment
of the system, will continue its efforts. Under such conditions they
would be required to develop , market and install each innovative effort
through a lengthy and sometimes disillusioning process. Such is the
situation today with the Methods and Systems Staff. It was created as
a result of the Macomber Task Force recommendation that some group
should seek out and introduce new managerial and analytical techniques
into the Department. Though laudable in concept, this effort originates
from the management (administrative) side of the house, not the substantive
or policy side. Therefore, it has neither strong executive support, funds
for research or training, nor top level technical expertise. Though
staff members are enthusiastic, they are forced to compromise and dilute
their advice in order to achieve a modicum of success. If the Secretary's
or Under Secretary's priorities remain unchanged, the Methods and Systems
Staff has a long road ahead.
3. Shortcomings in the PARA Concept
Before proceeding with the development of a foreign affairs
policymaking model, one final question should be answered. What if the
PARA/CASP system were to take effect the way its designers envisioned
it? Would It meet the needs of the Department?
W

Throughout the discussion of PARA and the explanation of CASP in
this chapter, strong and weak points of the concepts have been presented.
The author's answer to the above question is no; the envisioned PARA
will not meet the needs of the Department, and the CASP does not meet
the present requirements for a PARA. A review of the proposed system's
conceptual shortcomings should bear out this contention.
First and foremost, the PARA system is not designed for the
total foreign affairs community. It limits itself to the Department
of State, and further subordinates its policymaking processes to the
current NSC system. Secondly, the PARA system follows the CASP approach
to resource allocation, rendering either invalid or inconsequent the
policy analysis which is produced, because it fails to take adequate
account of the "opportunity cost' of scarce resources. Policies,
programs and alternatives are developed xvithout regard to their feasi-
bility and preferability , while choices among alternatives are made
without explicit consideration of cost. No less a weakness to the
policy analysis and choice processes is the lack of measures of effective-
ness applicable to the strategic planning, program or operational per-
spectives. There is no explicit methodology in the PARA system for
evaluation of the effectiveness of alternatives at any phase of the
policymaking process.
The previous look at CASP processes revealed significant
deficiencies in the annual cycle, since a major effort is expended each
year in totally redoing the CASP's throughout ARA. The environment
6° Opportunity cost is the real cost or sacrifice, in terms of




is fixed eighteen months before the planning period begins, and a large
amount of work is done to arrive at many of the previous year's conclu-
sions. Once the cycle is complete, the same effort begins again on
FY 2, still six months before the CASP for FY 1 takes effect. Conse-
quently, the resultant action document is dated, but no attempt is
made to review and update it because of the massive effort already
expended and current demand for a subsequent CASP. The result is a
product that is produced at great expense in manpower, but seldom
consulted and even less frequently considered binding.
A final weakness of the PARA system is its lack of a global
unified and central concept . There is no universal PARA idee fixe .
Four regional bureaus have developed their own ideas and methodologies
with broad variance in levels of sophistication. No Departmental entity
has been charged with devising a global theory or structure for policy-
making. No effort has been expended to create even a loose union among
the four systems now in existence. Without a central unifying force
and the development of a universally applicable body of theory, the
present regional concepts can do little but grow more divergent. The
longer this situation continues to exist, the more institutionalized
and resistant to change these independent efforts will become.
In the following chapters, the author has designed a foreign
affairs policymaking system which should overcome most, if not all, of
the deficiencies noted above. The next chapter commences with a
positive view of what the system should be.
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III. POLICYMAKING FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL
The presentation of the policymaking model will be in two parts.
This chapter gives a description and discussion of the major character-
istics this writer believes requisite in foreign affairs policymaking.
In Chapter IV a detailed analysis is made of the model's four principal
phases of policymaking and their component sub-processes.
The major characteristics of the proposed policymaking system are:
1) the system must be qualitative in character; 2) it must enhance both
objective and intuitive decisionmaking; 3) it must have policy evaluation
capabilities; 4) it must incorporate allocation of scarce resources;
5) it is designed for a unified foreign affairs community; 6) it stresses
an effective communications network and built-in information feedback
system; and 7) the system must be flexible, in its capability to make
immediate adjustments to changing policy environments and in the long-
range growth and development of the policymaking system.
A. THE SYSTEM MUST BE QUALITATIVE IN CHARACTER
Two overriding problems have plagued analysts in their efforts over
the past decade to program foreign affairs: conceptual difficulties in
quantification of variables and measurement criteria, and the complexities
of establishing the linkage between inputs and outputs in setting foreign
policy. In the writer's opinion it was the combination of quantification
and linkage problems that led to the almost total input orientation of
the early programming efforts in foreign affairs. The Comprehensive
61 A detailed description of the two systems in this category, CCPS
and FAPS, is given in Mosher and Harr, op_. cit
.
, Ch. I and III.
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Country Programming System (CCPS) rigidly required that all inputs at
the country level be expressed in either dollars or man-hours. The
subsequent Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS) dropped the man-
hour dimension but continued to require monetary measures of input costs,
Then unable to establish linkages between their dollar and man-hour
inputs and the foreign policy and program outputs, proponents of pro-
gramming continued to aggregate salaries of diplomats, administrators
and clerks, together with foreign aid appropriations, loans and grants.
They argued that the more data they could accumulate and analyze, the
better would be the resulting decisions. This writer agrees with
Frederick Mosher that little appreciation was shown for "...the fact
that many decisions in the foreign affairs arena, probably the most
important ones, are not budgetary.... The principal determinants of
such decisions are qualitative, not reducible to dollars or other count-
able units.
The above discussion should not be construed by the reader as
condemnation of quantitative analysis in the planning and implementa-
tion of foreign policy decisions. In those limited areas where goals
and objectives can be made operational and explicit, inputs are quan-
tifiable, and measurement criteria exist, quantitative analysis offers
positive advantages to the decisionmaker.
2 Frederick C. Mosher, "Program Budgeting in Foreign Affairs:




Yet even in the areas where quantitative analysis is most applicable,
the decisionmaker will have a range of qualitative inputs that measurably
affect his judgment. Quade clearly points-out that the higher the level
of decision, the more intuitive and subjective the decision process
becomes
.
The point is that every quantitative analysis, no matter
how innocuous it appears, eventually passes into an area where
pure analysis fails, and subjective judgment enters. This is
important; in making these choices the real decisions may be
being made. In other words, judgment and intuition permeate
every aspect of analysis: in limiting its extent; in deciding
what hypotheses and approaches are likely to be more fruitful;
in determining what the "facts" are and what numerical values
to use, and in finding the logical sequence of steps from
assumption to conclusion. °3
It is mandatory, then, to design a system which enhances qualitative
analysis techniques in policymaking. Such a system should take advantage
of quantitative inputs, when available, but cannot rely on quantification.
Analysis is of no lower order simply because it is not expressed in
symbols; this writer believes that the reverse nay be true. The judg-
mental abilities of an effective high-level decisionmaker are continuously
in scarce supply, as they can be developed only through a lengthy process
of education, training and experience in an increasingly complex environ-
ment. To attempt to bypass or supplant these abilities would be to
ignore the most valuable and productive of resources. The level of
technology necessary to reproduce or even simulate such complex judg-
mental processes does not exist now, nor is it likely to exist in the
forseeable future. The solution must be to recognize these subjective
aspects of policymaking and incorporate them into the system in a manner
designed to take fullest advantage of their strengths.
°^ E. S. Quade, "On the Limitations of Quantitative Analysis,"
RAND Paper P-^530, December 1970, p. 10.
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As Quade has noted, subjective elements already are implicit in
the decisionmaking process. The author believes that a decisionmaker
can recognize and list many of the elements of intuition and subjective
judgment he will use to evaluate a particular situation. Then he can
array the quantifiable elements together with them and obtain a more
complete look at the inputs to his own decision process.
Once a decisionmaker can view all these elements together, his
understanding of the problem should be increased. He should be able
to better recognize and assess alternative courses of action and per-
haps even assign values or weightings to the qualitative elements.
What are these qualitative aspects of decisionmaking? Once they
are arrayed, how analytic can the decisionmaker be? These questions
lead to the next requirement of our policymaking system.
B. BOTH OBJECTIVE AND INTUITIVE DECISIONMAKING
... it is no longer enough merely to state the existence of
nonrational factors; policy scientists must find a way of
taking account of their presence In the decision process
so that their distorting effects can be reduced. Just as we
have developed neat analytical models to describe problems,
identify alternatives, and assess the effectiveness and
efficiency of each choice, so must we begin to explicate non-
rational factors in the policy process and to design models
useful to policy formulators in assessing elements of non-
rationality in their decisions. ^
The above comment by Dr. Timothy W. Costello is apt; the intuitive
or "non-rational" factors must be taken explicitly into account when
examining or designing policymaking processes. Yet this writer takes
issue with Dr. Costello' s implication that these factors are a negative,
65 Timothy W. Costello, "Psychological Aspects: The Soft Side of
Policy Formation," Policy Sciences , vol. 1, no. 2, 1970, pp. 161-162.
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"distorting" influence in the decisionmaking process. As already noted,
the inductive reasoning capabilities of effective high-level decision-
makers are scarce and valuable resources which should be exploited rather
than avoided. Efforts should be taken to develop and make explicit the
inductive capacity, intuition and insight of human beings, understanding
that these processes are essential in those many areas where analytical
tools and techniques have not been developed or perfected. This author
prefers Yehezkel Dror's interpretation of extrarational [nonrational]
factors in policymaking.
First, limited resources, uncertain conditions and lack of
knowledge place strict limits on the degree to which policy-
making can feasibly be rational, so that policymakers much
necessarily rely a great deal on extrarational processes.
Second, only extrarational processes will work in some
phases of policymaking; for example, policymakers need
"creativity" to invent new alternatives. Third ... extra-
rational processes may solve some problems in some phases
better than rational processes could, even though the latter
by themselves could also solve the problems.""
In the third case Dror is hypothesizing a situation where the rational
process is fully developed, but the well-developed "extrarational"
process is more efficient and more effective. To illustrate: an
experienced diplomat may be more accurate, as well as much quicker,
in his assessment of a country's predicted reaction to a given situa-
tion than could be ascertained through a detailed historical analysis
of that country's reaction patterns in similar circumstances. His informed
intuition may recognize subtle changes in attitudes that would not be
apparent in the aggregated data.
Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined , op . cit . , pp. 157-158.
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Although the discussion in this section centers around the inductive
and intuitive aspects of decisionmaking, it is implicit that the pure-
67
rationality process would be used in those areas where the information
is available and the operations of securing and processing it are cost-
effective. The concept here is that there will be few, if any, "pure"
cases of either strategy for decisionmaking. Optimal policymaking will
be a mix of rationality and informed intuition, with the weighting of
each component dependent on a number of variables, such as availability
of resources, perspective, amount of information at hand and degree of
inductive capacity.
Finally, Marshall Wiley presents the view of the FSO and the princi-
pal officials of the Department of State, that "...informed and exper-
ienced judgment remains the central requirement for foreign affairs
personnel...." When faced with such an institutional philosophy, this
writer believes it is critical that the policymaking system takes full
advantage of the type of judgmental talents developed within the Foreign
Service, and incorporates a mixture of rational and inductive/intuitive
processes in order to achieve this.
"' "Pure rationality", as used here, implies total adherence to the
"rational" principles of taking into account every aspect of the problem,
inventorying and weighting every factor that will bear on the decision,
being completely accurate in predicted outcomes for alternatives, and
making decisions by calculating expected values and choosing the best.
See Dror, ibid.
, pp. 132-133-
° Marshall W. Wiley, "Developing a Strategy of Organizational




C. EVALUATION OF POLICY EFFECTIVENESS
It is the writer's opinion that to design a system which is qual-
itative in character and enhances the application of "informed intuition"
to decisionmaking corresponds to recognition of the realities in the
foreign affairs policymaking environment. Incorporation of these facets
into the system is no indication that its processes should be any less
rigorously analytic or any less quantitative when quantification is
possible. A dynamic, interactive policymaking system must be able to
make accurate assessments of the effectiveness of policy decisions, from
the highest conceptual level to the most particular operational activity.
The idea of applying measures of effectiveness to policy decisions
has a great deal of intuitive appeal, but the problem of developing
valid measures In useable form is one of the most complex areas of
policy analysis.
...consider policymaking on foreign relations. Suboptimization
requires that foreign policy issues be allocated to territorial
and functional subdivisions of the Department of State and of
other departments and agencies. .. .All these bodies, working
separately, must inevitably make many contradictory subpolicies.
The policymaking system must be constantly evaluated and, when
necessary, redesigned so as to minimize these negative con-
sequences of suboptimization, to establish and strengthen needed
integrating mechanisms, and to allow for the constant changes
in the problems, values, and resources fed into the system from
its environment .69
The concept of effectiveness measurement came into being when
systems analysis swept through the Department of Defense. Due to the
nature of the tasks at DOD, most of the effort was applied in the area
of hardware procurment, where specific pieces of military equipment
were designed to perform fixed tasks at prescribed levels. The measures





then became the relative abilities of the equipment to perform as
prescribed; and most of these measures were of easily quantifiable
outputs, such as velocity, accuracy, capacity, and so on. Even the
most ambitious attempts did not stray, beyond the aggregation of various
mixes of individual effectiveness measures, in an effort to evaluate
unit or group performance. It is not difficult to understand why initial
efforts to transfer almost purely quantitative reasoning to the qualita-
tive problems of foreign affairs were doomed to early failure, yet the
necessity for policy evaluation methods has become increasingly critical.
As John Franklin Campbell observed:
If no more convincing rationale for foreign aid can be found
than the old anti-communist "national security" argument
coupled with generalized American "responsibility" to raise
the living standards of poorer states, then AID appropriations
will continue to go down. These arguments offer no guide lines
for the apportionment of limited U.S. resources, and no yard-
sticks of accomplishment. They are essentially ideological
arguments, and they have been used not only for economic aid,
but also to justify U.S. military, intelligence and propaganda
programs .70
The past shortcomings of quantitative approaches to evaluation of
foreign policy decisions are not, however, indicative of the present
state-of-the-art. It is the author's contention that even in the
least quantifiable problem areas, the decisionmaker would find it
advantageous to make explicit and array all the subjective inputs he
can recognize as having a bearing on his decision. Once this informa-
tion is before him, he can group, weight and evaluate these variables
with less liklihood of one item assuming a disproportionate degree of
influence on the outcome. The topics of measurement criteria and
standards will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.
70 John Franklin Campbell, "What Is To Be Done?" Foreign Affairs ,
vol. 49, no. 1, October 1970, p. 85.
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D. ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES
To be valid, any analysis of policy options must subsume scarcity
of resources from the outset; otherwise, policy actions which are
infeasible due to insufficient resources would not be identified, and
the alternative which offers greatest effectiveness might not surface.'
As Hitch and McKean recognized, it is axiomatic that:
... in all problems of choice we strive to get the most out of
what we have. To put it another way, we try to use the resources
that are available to us so as to maximize what economists call
"utility." Resources are always limited in comparison with our
action. (If they did not, we could do everything, and there
would be no problem of choosing preferred courses of action. )'2
The necessary relationship, then, is the linkage of resources to
policy actions, where alternatives are weighed and decisions made on
the basis of the greatest benefit achievable from the level of resources
available. This type of
. . .analysis has great value in turning debates over resource
allocation toward the realities and away from simple state-
ments of noble purpose. . .
.
Second and closely related, analysis is oriented toward
outputs rather than toward inputs. In this way expenditures
can be tied to specific goals, and those expenditures which
satisfy primarily the traditions or well-being of individual
agencies are brought into question .7
3
The above points concerning measures of policy effectiveness
and allocation of resources relate to the entire foreign affairs com-
munity; yet as Dror pointed out, the many agencies in the field of
foreign affairs do not function as a cohesive body. Each is for the
7 1 For a discussion of maximizing effectiveness in the economic
context, see Gene H. Fisher, Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis ,
(New York: American Elsevier Publishing Co.) 1971, pp. 38-^0.
? 2 Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age
,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1961, pg. 23.








most part independent, budgeted separately by the Congress, and inclined
to optimize within its own purview. Campbell phrases the issue quite
succinctly:
The most important administrative task of all is currently
not performed by anyone in V/ashington. The government has no
unified foreign affairs budget. Like the three armed services
in the 1950' s, each agency negotiates separately with the Budget
Bureau and then with Congress. This reinforces the impression
that we have not one, but many conflicting foreign policies.^
Thomas Schelling extends the same idea as an explanation of the primary
reason why earlier program budgeting efforts fail at State.
...the budget does not yet exist to which PPBS might be applied
in the field of foreign affairs. When Secretary McNamara assumed
office, he was at least fifteen years ahead of where the Secretary
of State is now in having a recognized budget. . .
.
Not so the Secretary of State, whose own budg;et of about a
third of a billion dollars a year corresponds, to take a very
crude analogy, to the budget that the Secretary of Defense might
present for the operation of the Pentagon building and the people
who work in it. 7
5
It was not the purpose of this paper to seek-out, much less recom-
mend major statutory alterations in existing foreign affairs bureau-
cracies. The writer recognized at the outset that such an approach
could have the undesirable effect of causing the rest of the thesis
to be discounted by some of those for whom it is written. Yet all this
writer's investigations point to the necessity for moving from budgetary
separatism in foreign affairs to consolidation.
™ Campbell, op_. cit .
75 Schelling, op. cit., pp. 114-115,
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Obviously budgetary discretion and control is a source of influence
and power. Many experts have recognized budgetary separatism in the
if,
foreign affairs community as an impediment to a unified foreign policy,
but few have offered any specific proposals for remedying the situation.
In the writer's opinion, John Campbell has developed the most workable
solution of any to be found in the literature. Since coercive control
over a unified foreign affairs budget is of principal import to the
policymaking model presented here, Campbell's recommendations bear con-
sideration. In his most recent work Campbell proposed:
State's present number-five official, the Deputy Under Secretary
for administration, [now "management"] could be redesignated
Deputy Under Secretary for the budget, responsible to the Secre-
tary, with other agency agreement, to prepare an integrated
foreign affairs budget for the executive branch. The Inter-
national division of the White House Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), comprised of about fifty personnel in all, should
be transferred to the new State budget office. Ultimately,
American ambassadors in the field should be called on to justify
and control all annual government expenditures in their countries,
and the five regional assistant secretaries of state should also
review these expenditure plans. The Secretary of State should
be directly accountable to the President for control over the
entire spectrum of moneys and staffs employed abroad, with the
exception of military troop costs. 77
The policy evaluation and resource allocation functions can only be
executed properly when substantive and resource management are vested
in the same entity, in this case the Secretary of State. An integrated
foreign affairs budget is only an element of a much broader concept
essential to the proposed model for a policymaking system, namely the
notion of a unified foreign policy mechanism.
' For discussion of budgetary separatism in foreign affairs, see
John P. Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory; Mosher and Harr,
Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership ; Thomas Schelling,
"PPBS And Foreign Affairs" (detailed cites in bibliography).
77 John Franklin Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory , (New
York: Basic Books, Inc. Publishers) 1971 > p. 235.
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E. UNIFIED FOREIGN AFFAIRS POLICYMAKING SYSIEM
In theory, the State Department has hegemony over all agencies
involved In the conduct of foreign affairs. The realities simply do
not support this, as has already been noted with regard to the budget.
Each [agency] has its own powers and responsibilities, whether
authorized by statute or executive order or delegation. Each
has its own budget and the accountability for its use, and its
own set of subcommittees to deal with in Congress. Each hires
its own personnel, controls their assignments and commands
their loyalties.
Obviously, a system of programming and budgeting which in-
cluded the activities of all agencies in individual countries
and whose primary channel was from Ambassador to Regional Assis-
tant Secretary to Under Secretary and Secretary of State could
be threatening to the autonomy of individual agencies. '°
Yet hegemony by one executive agency is essential to the development
of a" single" foreign policy. What is needed is more than Departmental
attempts at lateral coordination. In this writer's opinion, extreme
requirements for lateral coordination exist as the standard at State
today, producing a stereotype of what von Mises calls the "opprobrious
79
connotation of the term bureaucracy . " Richard Holbrooke cites per-
haps a classic example of such "opprobrium.
"
A desk officer in State has recently calculated that while
in theory he is the focal point of all Washington efforts con-
cerning "his" country, in fact there are 16 people working on
the country in Washington, in different chains of command. They
are receiving information directly from the Americans In the
country through up to nine different channels. No one sees all
the communications in every channel. Through great effort the
desk officer has come to know all the other officers, but, he
points out, they change regularly (himself included); someone
is always out of town or sick; and most importantly, each one
has his own boss, who can determine his future career; each one
has his own set of priority projects and problems. "All I can





79 Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy
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(New Haven: Yale University Press)
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It is difficult, If not impossible, for such a mechanism to be
responsive to the President, much less one of his principal agents.
Only through personal monitoring and intervention can the President
now insure that his concept is that carried out, for implementation is
frequently spread throughout numerous functional and regional bureaus
of agencies over which the Secretary of State and his assistants have
no control. In Henry Kissinger's viewpoint, "The impact on national
policy is pernicious. Even our highest policy bodies... are less con-
cerned with developing measures in terms of a well-understood national
purpose than with adjusting the varying approaches of semi-autonomous
„8l
departments.
In the writer's opinion, the choices for a foreign affairs policy-
malting system are clear1 . The incorporation of less than both formula-
tion and implementation phases into the same policymaking structure
might not yield appreciable results. Implicit to the fusion of these
phases is centralized budgetary power. Independently funded agencies
cannot, or will not, subordinate all policymaking or implementing
activities to the will of one coordinating authority, that is, State,
while being expected to justify the funding of those policies or imple-
menting programs to the Congress,
There are obvious disadvantages to this centralization of policy-
making and budgetary powers, particularly when the agencies which have
been incorporated into a unified system have clearly defined tasks to
O-i







perform and have developed a high level of expertise in their fields.
A useful analogy may be found in the relationships among the Secretary
of Defense and the three armed services. The period when Robert Mc
Namara was secretary was one of great centralization in the operation
of the Department of Defense, and some of the negative aspects of this
Op
structure are only now being recognized. If too high a degree of
centralization is allowed, a whole new spectrum of difficulties can
arise. These problems of over-centralization may equal in severity
the problems of over-decentralization. Herbert Simon states the case
quite well:
We may conclude, then, that some measure of centraliza-
tion is indespensable to secure the advantages of organization:
coordination, expertise, and responsibility. On the other hand,
the costs of centralization must not be forgotten. It may place
in the hands of highly paid personnel decisions which do not
deserve their attention. It may lead to a duplication of func-
tion which makes the subordinate superfluous. Facilities for
communication must be available, sometimes at considerable
cost. The information needed for a correct decision may be
available only to the subordinate. Finally, centralization
leaves idle and unused the powerful coordinative capacity of
the human nervous system, and substitutes for it an interper-
sonal coordinative mechanism .83
With the above discussion well in mind, the writer remains convinced
that an effective policymaking system for the foreign affairs community
must, at the outset, employ a strict hegemonic relationship between the
central coordinating authority, the Department of State, and the semi-
autonomous agencies. In order to maintain coherent foreign policy from
inception through implementation, decision levels must be clearly
82 a well-researched, if slanted, discussion of the centralized
Defense Department structure under McNamara may be found in Enthoven
and Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers)
1970, Ch. 3.
°3 Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior
,
(New York: The Free
Press) 1957, pp. 239-240.
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defined and laterally centralized to insure effective interagency
coordination and control. Vertically , the foreign affairs management
hierarchy should be a decentralized organization, requiring most imple-
mentation decisions to be made by the Chief-of-Mission and his staff
at the country level. The Chief-of-Mission, an Ambassador or a Minister,
is surely capable of supervising program implementation and operational
decisionmaking; the last three Chief Executives have explicitly expressed
this point-of-view.
Structuring the foreign affairs policymaking system in this manner
should yield two principal benefits. First, it should stimulate the
inter-agency cohesiveness necessary to the conduct of a coherent policy,
and constitute an enormous stride toward unification of the foreign
affairs community. Secondly, such a structure should place decision-
making authority at the appropriate levels, relieving Department
principals of much routine work that could be handled better by the
Country Team.
Finally, the author is not alone in his assessment that time is
not on the side of the bureaucracies. The machinery is growing contin-
ually more ponderous and cumbersome while the demands placed on it are
escalating at a phenomenal rate.
The person who has the most to gain from a massive reform
of the foreign affairs machine—besides the American taxpayer
—
is the President himself. If a manageable and responsive
apparatus is a true Presidential priority, then he personally
must order major changes. Each President must decide whether
or not he will attempt major changes, or instead choose to
"^President Kennedy's letter to the ambassadors, 29 May 196l;
Message of the Secretary of State "To My Colleagues in the Department
of State and Abroad" on the Occasion of NSAM 3^1, *J March 1966.
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build small, personally loyal, bypass mechanisms with which
to carry out policy on those matters of overwhelming high-
level interest. Increasingly in recent years, the White House
has chosen the latter route. 85
P. COMMUNICATION
Without communication there could be no bureaucracy, no delegation,
no Department of State. Communication is the process through which
orders, information necessary to decisionmaking, and advice are trans-
mitted from a decision point to other parts of the organization. It
is also the process that returns to the decisionmaker information about
the quality of his prior decisions (feedback). It is a process that
flows up, down and laterally throughout the structure, travelling in
numerous modes and channels.
Since the flow of information is the life blood of the Depart-
ment, decisions concerning the information flow are, in fact,
basic decisions on how the Department will be organized and
how its operations will be conducted.""
It is too commonly assumed that the communications network consists
of the formal hierarchical channels established for information flows.
In reality the formal channels are only a small part of the whole net-
work in a functioning organization. The organizational chart may not-
at-all depict the actual functional structure of an organization; however,
a mapping of the true communications network would reveal an extra-
ordinary power structure within and beyond the ordinary organization.
No matter how elaborate a system of formal communications is
set up in the organization, this system will always be supple-
mented by formal channels. Through these informal channels will
flow information, advice, and even orders. 87













The informal communications network is usually of overall benefit
to the organization, as it frequently can disseminate information much
faster than the formal structure. It often appears to have channels with
almost infinite capacity. In designing a policymaking system, however,
the drawbacks In the informal network must be considered. The informa-
tion passed is not always accurate, as rumor and gossip get the same
high priority as fact. If the channels in the formal structure are not
explicit or do not have adequate capacity, primary information flows
may be halted or rerouted through the informal network, changing the
88
actual system of relationships in the decision process. Knowledge
is power in a large organization, and should certainly be treated that
way in the design of a policymaking system.
Information flow in the Department of State is an acute problem
because of the ambiguous power structure in foreign affairs management,
which is so overextended laterally and layered vertically that the
89
decision process moves sluggishly, at best.
A new Under Secretary of State discovers that a routine
cable—the kind that Under Secretaries are not supposed to
see—on the Pood for Peace Program has received 27 clearances
before being sent out. No one is able to convince him that
27 different people need to agree to the dispatch of such
a message. 90
It was emphasized in the first chapter that bureaucratic responsiveness
in the area of foreign affairs is a necessity for the Chief Executive.
But as Campbell points out:
88 Ibid
., pp. 157-162.









Communication within and between departments is time-consuming
and imprecise, and it is nearly impossible to change ingrained
outlooks and procedures. Because the system is difficult to
manage and hard to rely on, a modern President is tempted to
bypass it comoletely and develop his own more informal methods
of decision. 91
The current President has done just this, and, in this writer's
opinion, has coiipounded the communications problem severely by isolating
and bypassing the seventh floor, and thereby removing much of the Depart-
ment ' s raison d'etre .
"
It is clear to this writer that any design of a policymaking system
for foreign affairs must pay careful heed to matching an appropriate
communications network with the desired structure of relationships. The
formal information channels must be well-defined, comprehensive and
broad enough to handle a large volume of priority traffic. The design
must take into consideration the formation of an informal network, and
insure that there exists no ambiguity in decision points, or power
relationships which might be realigned by the efficacy of informal
communications. Finally, numerous lateral coordinations and unneces-
sary vertical layering must not be allowed to impede the infonnation
flow.
The communication system must provide a number of formal services
to the organization of the area of management information. It must
furnish a wide range of high quality information in its daily dissemina-
tion of message traffic, memoranda and other paper flow. It must serve
as the organizational memory, necessitating a highly flexible storage
91 Campbell, "What Is To Be Done," op_. cit
. ,
p. 82.
92 See discussions of the NSC system in Chapter 1 and the NSC
relationship with PARA in Chapter 2.
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and retrieval system for records, reports and other multiple data files.
The system must be discrimnatory in serving the user, neither inundating
an individual with unneeded paper flow nor isolating him by providing
too little information.
Today's technology makes such selective and flexible processes pos-
sible through well-tested and proven computerized information handling
systems. -J Most of the necessary computer hardware is already available
within the Department of State, and has been for some time. Preliminary
design of several important information subsystems was completed in
1967. The writer feels that this work could be used to develop sub-
systems ready for implementation within six months. The quality of
present-day foreign policy decisions should not be constrained at the
outset by archaic nineteenth century administrative procedures.
Implicit in Information flow is the necessary feedback to the
decision points; consequently, the communications system must provide
adequate channel capacity for feedback. Multiple channels are required
to carry both the immediate feedback necessary for short term policy
review and revision, and the even more ijrportant "learning feedback"
which is directed toward major policy analyses and improvement of
policymaking processes.
93 Gilbert Burck, The Computer Age, (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers) 1964, pp. 2-25".
9 11 Based on writer's personal survey and evaluation of Department
of State's facilities, conducted 2^-28 January, 1972, and summarized
in a memorandum to Mr. James Ennis, Director, Methods and Systems Staff,
2 February 1972.
95 Department of State report, "A Modern Information System for the
Department of State," prepared by the Substantive Information Systems
Program Staff, now defunct.
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Finally, the system must look outward in its efforts to acquire
information and knowledge. It should procure and store pertinent data
from a number of external sources, supplemental to normal in-house
research and collection capabilities.
The communication system, as the policymaking system, should be
in a continuous state of evolution, advancing and improving capabilities
as new concepts and technologies permit.
G. SYSTEM FLEXIBILITY AND LONG RANGE DEVELOPMENT
At this point in the discussion, most of the major characteristics
of the model have been covered. To summarize, the proposed policymaking
system is to be qualitative in character, incorporate explicit designs
for intuitive or inductive decisionmaking, employ advanced communica-
tions system design, and be a truely integrated foreign affairs system.
Not yet developed is a way to avoid the inflexibility with which the
CASP and PARA systems respond to change, causing much of their product
to be ignored. Additionally, a desirable system must have the ability
to restructure itself and evolve with time.
A policymaking system, to be useful over time, must have the flex-
ibility to update policies and plans quickly when major environmental
changes take place. As explained in Chapter II, the CASP may be as
much as eighteen months out-of-date when it takes effect at the start
of the fiscal year. The document becomes rigid, however, because the
Country Team is already deeply involved in planning for the period two
years in the future. Rather than to update immediately with changes in
specific policy, the concept is to review and rewrite annually the




Three elements are important to insure flexibility. First the
system must have continuous update and revision capabilities, and
discard the concept of total annual planning. Ceasing the annual
drudgery of rewriting the entire country plan should free PSO's to
concentrate on the specific issues which warrant close attention and
revision, thereby improving the quality of their efforts. The possi-
bility that such an approach would be less effective in identifying
those issues that surface through the CASP approach does exist, but
the writer contends that the reduction in work load will, in reality,
facilitate more frequent and comprehensive reviews than previously
were possible.
Secondly, the proposed system offers a procedure for developing
goals, objectives and courses of action, identifying or creating a
number of feasible alternatives for each, and analytically selecting
the preferable ones. Such a process should remove some of the con-
straints on creativity within the Department
.
Thirdly, there are possible situations for which contingency plan-
ning is essential. When a change in the environment is predictable
with a high probability, a plan should be made. When a major change
in the environment is less predictable but the consequences of being
caught unprepared are costly, the principal contingencies should be
considered. A flexible policymaking system should identify these
cases and develop necessary plans.
The policymaking system also must provide for a long term view of
its capacity and capabilities, and change over time in order to produce
the best possible decisions. This capability of the system to grow
and change requires continuous processes of redesign, development and
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implementation. Part of this concept is referred to by Dror as "plan-
ning the planning system" and draws heavily on the "learning feedback"
capacities of the policymaking structure. Learning feedback permits
96
the system to improve itself on the basis of its experience, and is
based on detailed analyses of system outputs over a period of time.
Since the activities of learning feedback are related to "think tank"
concepts in their requirements for detailed study and creativity, the
writer feels that they should be performed by a staff which is some-
what removed from day-to-day crisis management and time constraints.
The Macomber Task Force on Management Evaluation Systems included
a similar analysis capability in their proposed Management Evaluation
97Group (MEG). Implementation of the Task Force XII recommendations,
however, struck that portion of the proposal, leaving only the standard
98inspection and audit functions under the Office of the Inspector General.
Such are the characteristics of the proposed policymaking system.
The following chapter presents a conceptual model that incorporates the
functions so strongly advocated in this chapter.
96 Dror, op_. cit., pp. l6l, 193-196.
97 "Diplomacy for the 70' s," op_. cit.
,
pp. 5?9-530. The proposed
"Policy and Program Evaluation Staff" was strongly objected to by the
Department's Planning and Coordination Staff (S/PC) because of the
fear that administrative personnel, untrained in "substantive" matters,
would be telling experienced diplomats how to make foreign policy. The
author was a member of S/PC at that time, and followed the situation's
progress.
98 Department of State, Management Reform Bulletin No. 25, "The




IV. POLICYMAKING FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS; A GENERAL MODEL
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
1. Overview of Policymaking
Chapter III contained descriptions of seven characteristics
the writer believes should be incorporated into a policymaking system
for foreign affairs. In this chapter it is the writer's purpose to
design a policymaking process which incorporates these characteristics.
The model is a prescriptive one, proposing a preferred organization of
elements and phases into stages of policymaking which, in the aggregate,
form the policymaking process.
Four stages have been identified in this process mode].: 1)
system design, development and control; 2) policy formulation; 3) policy
implementation; and 4) policy operations. The policy formulation,
implementation and operations stages incorporate those elements of
foreign policymaking that the Foreign Service Officer recognizes as
" substantive
;
n °° therefore, these three stages have been termed the
"substantive management" stages. The system design, development and
control stage incorporates those phases which Dror calls "policymaking
on how to make policy," as well as some of the "post-policymaking"
phases. This stage is concerned with the policymaking system, its
initial design, and its ability to grow and change. The description
"" The political and general economic fields are known by FSOs as
"substantive" fields of diplomacy. See John E. Harr, The Professional






of the policymaking process will concentrate on the development of each
of these four stages and the phases and principal elements contained
in them.
One way of looking at the stages of policymaking is to observe
the constraints on their activities. The three substantive management
stages fall into a simple pattern. Chart 2 shows these three stages
as concentric circles, where each ring acts as a set of constraints
101for those activities within its perimeter. The policy formulation
stage, shown in the outer ring, contains the most general phases of
identifying key issues and determining policy goals and objectives.
It is at this stage of the process where those pressures external to
the system have the greatest influence. This stage, in turn, estab-
lishes the set of policy objectives which act as the bounds for program
development in the implementation stage. In the center of the chart
are policy operations, the most constrained activities of the entire
process. In this stage the managerial tasks of achieving efficiency
and economy are emphasized, and little latitude exists for resource
trade-offs within the tight operational guidelines.
Although the circular representation of constraints can show
the substantive management stages, it cannot show the relationship of
the system design, development and control stage to those three. Chart
101 i^2.s depiction of the substantive management stages was adapted
from Prof. H. Paul Ecker's chart of the management cycle, developed
at the Navy Management Systems Center, Monterey.
102
A description similar to this may be found in Robert N. Anthony,
Planning and Control Systems : A Framework for Analysis (Boston: Graduate



















3 gives a better overview of the entire policymaking process, showing
the principal relationships among the four stages and the phases within
each stage.
The system design, development and control stage is designed to
have a unifying force on the overall system. Its elements monitor the
functions of the system at all stages, evaluate the quality of its out-
put, and re-design those elements that do not perform in the preferred
manner. It is this stage that gives the system the flexibility to grow
and develop over time.
The policy formulation stage incorporates those phases of
strategic planning noted by Professor Ecker:
In the strategic planning process we are concerned with
deciding on organizational objectives [goals] in terms of
the broad policies on the acquisition, use and disposition
of these resources. We are first concerned with choosing
objectives and second with the formulation of long or short
range plans on how to achieve the objectives. 103
Allocation of scarce resources is taken into account at the highest
conceptual level, and the goals and objectives developed here are for
the foreign affairs community, not just the Department of State.
"In the implementation process, our concern is with the develop-
ment of programs within the given objectives. "lO^This description of
the implementation stage is somewhat different from the common useage
of the term, ascribing somewhat more decisionmaking latitude to those
charged with getting programs from the conceptual to the operating level,
103 ppom lecture entitled "Management II," prepared by H. Paul Ecker





























































Finally, the operations stage takes programs which have been
implemented and operates them as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Data from these operations are collected over a period of time and be-
come a principal source of information for development of learning feed-
back for system control.
The following sections will describe in detail the phases of
the four policymaking stages. To assist the reader in following this
development, the succeeding charts will be keyed to Chart 3; and a
miniature Chart 3 will appear on each blow-up, indicating the phase
being discussed.
2. System Design, Development and Control
Although the functions involved in centralized design and
coordination of the policymaking system are termed a "stage," they
actually are integrated throughout the formulation, implementative
and operational stages of the policymaking process. The three phases
of this stage, system design, system development and system control,
are shown on Chart 3 to the left of the vertical broken line. Their
expanded diagrams are found on Charts 4, 5 arid 6.
It is the writer's opinion that the conceptual design of a
policymaking system for foreign affairs has been almost totally neglected
in the past decade's efforts to develop a foreign affairs programming
system. As was discussed at length in Chapter II, there is no under-
lying body of theory for the PARA system; and no uniform design require-
ments for PARA must be met by the regional bureaus. The writer further
noted in his research that little effort has been made by the Department
to take advantage of major advances in the state of international rela-
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data handling and manipulation. These elements should have been taken
into account with in a policymaking phase devoted to conceptual design
and re-design of the system.
One important area of research that has major Implications for
system design is that of organizational behavior patterns. Modern
organization theory now regards such studies as essential to the develop-
ment of a structure that gains maximum benefit from the individual's
10S
abilities.
The only such study that this writer could find was funded by
the State Department ' s now disbanded Center for International Systems
Research, and prepared by Chris Argyris as a paper entitled "Some Causes
of Organization Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State." The
study met with such in-house resistance that it was withdrawn from the
Government Printing Office book store shortly after being released.
Human relations research is only one of the inputs necessary
to the design of a foreign affairs policymaking system. In the writer's
opinion, creative development of new ideas and approaches is not some-
thing that can be prepared by the average planning staff. Such a
process requires the meeting of many disciplines; and the staff organ-
ization effective in this pursuit should contain managerial and technical
talents, as well as the requisite substantive expertise. The writer
believes that research is essential into new policy science methodologies
and advanced managerial support systems. Information theory and cyber-
netics should be examined; automated data processing capabilities should
105 Joseph L. Massie, Essentials of Management , (Englewood Cliffs





be exploited to the fullest; and developments and theories in the new
fields of systems analysis and operations research should be carefully
examined for their analysis and design applications in policymaking.
In those areas where current theories and technologies do not
give the necessary support to foreign affairs policymaking, the writer
feels that the Department must initiate and support studies and research.
Approaches to this could include funding in-house task force study
groups for particular substantive problems, sponsoring no-strings uni-
versity research efforts in international relations and national security
affairs, sabbatical or fellowship programs for select B'SO's with uni-
versities and private research agencies, and outside contracts in those
highly specialized areas where no other recourse is feasible.
The writer believes continuous exposure to new ideas and
techniques to be essential for the individual tasked with creating
foreign affairs applications of new analytic tools and policymaking
methodologies. Additionally, these new ideas must be understood by
the senior officials who will be rendering decisions on their adoption;
and the key to this understanding is education. The writer sees the
need for specialized educational development programs to be instituted
over a wide span of levels and durations, from short orientation courses
for the senior executives with severe time constraints to full univer-
sity advanced degree programs for selected junior FSO's. This type of
program should allow the junior PSO to develop talents as an innovator
and coordinator of new techniques, while maintaining the understanding
and support of his seniors.
Between the extremes of brief orientation courses and university
programs the writer feels that there should be a range of specialized
instruction, designed toward limited objectives of preparing individuals
77

who will assume policy design or analysis roles. For individuals
between assignments or earmarked for policy analysis roles, courses
of four to six weeks in length, concentrating on specific talents
necessary to his new job, should enhance the incoming officer's abili-
ties and ease his transition to new duties. For those officers already
filling a critical assignment, university or FSI extension courses
easily could be taught for one hour each day, helping them to develop
new abilities. Computer programming, basic probability and statistics,
and several other specialties can be taught in one-hour increments on
television monitors. A host of high-quality self-study material and
correspondence courses are available in these specialties, and would
in the writer's opinion, be cost-effective investments for any of the
107
foreign affairs agencies.
The importance of research and education has been stressed in
this discussion of system design, but is significant in every aspect of
the policymaking system. The tools and methodologies developed in
policy research and applicable in all phases of policymaking, and the
requisite knowledge for using them and understanding their use is
again essential throughout.
Each of the elements and activities discussed above are inputs
into the development of a general policymaking system design concept,
as shown on Chart 4. From this point, the process introduces the exec-
tive planning and resource guidance in order to generate specific design
criteria. This global level planning guidance is that statement of
foreign policy interests and resource availability that is generated
' The writer developed these opinions in his contacts with the
Department over the past year, and made several explicit recommenda-
tions in a Memorandum to James Ennis, previously cited.
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by the executive branch to guide foreign affairs planning. The type
and amount of this guidance is a necessary input for the development of
system design criteria, such as specific structural and functional
requirements for both global and area planning systems, major elements
of the formal communications network, personnel requirements and
responsibilities, and the overall time-phased plan for system develop-
ment. These and other criteria would be organized into system design
guidance, which would be transmitted to those decisionmakers and staffs
responsible for action.
Once the design guidance is issued , the process of structuring
the planning systems begins (Chart 5). The global planning and resource
guidance and the system design guidance are the key elements used to
structure the global planning system. The process generates procedures
for developing area policy and resource guidance from the global guidance.
Key decision points are specified; roles of functional specialists are
made explicit; and a detailed formal information and feedback network
is constructed.
Concurrently, similar procedures are taking place in the develop-
ment of the area planning systems. At this level, a command and control
structure is detailed which incorporates the separate agencies and the
Department's functional bureaus into a working team. The interagency
effort envisioned in this model is not the IG review arrangement, where
loyalties are given first to the individual agencies. This staff will
have allegiance to a single decisionmaker, clearly defined channels of
communication, and the overall policymaking responsibilities of formu-
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Feedback to General Design Phase
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Once initial structures are established for global and area
planning systems, the next step is to develop a capability for monitor-
ing and modifying these structures, and revising the overall design
concept if necessary. Evaluation at this stage concerns itself pri-
marily with system implementation, and will perform detailed monitoring
operations in the early periods of planning system functioning. The
systems, at this point, are in a flexible state of development, where
procedures and techniques may be easily revised. For example, different
planning periods or methods of data handling may be tried concurrently
in several different regions or countries. As these methods are tested
and evaluated, the most effective are standardized throughout the system.
The evaluation system is fed more detailed data from all three phases
of policymaking, and uses this to further develop the policymaking tools
through successive iterations.
Again, the interactive nature of this system development and
control phase must not be overlooked. A continuous iterative process
of monitoring, evaluation, redesign and implementation is being per-
formed throughout the policymaking system. It is this ongoing process
that allows the system to develop and change with its environment, and
to approach a preferred level of performance.
3. Policy Formulation Stage
The multiple functions performed in the policy formulation
stage are detailed on Charts 7, 8 and 9- Foreign policy formulation
begins at the highest Executive level of government with the generation
of strategic planning guidance by the President and his advisors. Chart
7 does not do justice to the myriad pressures weighing on the Chief
Executive in this process; the reader should receive a better apprecia-
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Chart 2. The President must synthesize these outside forces with his
own desires and formulate a set of general policy goals. Using these
goals as a guide, the President, with assistance from such key officials
as the Secretary of State, Director of OMB, his special assistant for
NSA, and others, will develop his strategic planning and resourece
guidance.
There are two key items implicit in the above discussion that
require elaboration. First is the relationship of the presidential
advisory role to an ongoing policymaking system. It was explained in
Chapter II that one of the outcomes of the task force reports was
tacit recognition of the durability of the current NSC system in the
formulation and management of foreign policy. In the opinion of this
writer, granting such extensive powers to the personal advisory staff
of the President is an error for a number of reasons. Although the
foreign affairs bureaucracy is at present unresponsive to the Executive
will, this writer feels that the majority of talent is there. Further-
more the Chief Executive need not become more isolated from reality
108
than is already unavoidable. It is far better to make the supreme
effort required to restructure the bureaucracy than to abrogate policy-
making powers to the severely limited capabilities and capacities of
the NSC staff.
The second item that must be emphasized is the relationship of
fiscal constraints to all levels of the policymaking process. Budgetary
restrictions have been studiously ignored in the foreign affairs
108
p
or a discussion of this "isolation" of the Chief Executive,
see Reedy, op_. cit .
8*1

policymaking concepts of the past decade as was described in the CASP
and PARA discussions in Chapter II, yet it is impossible to carry out
any valid analysis of policy options at any conceptual level if this
initial criterion for feasibility is not considered. The current
reasoning that policies can be effectively formulated in the absence
of controls over their implementation is, to the writer's mind, specious.
Fiscal guidance in initial policy formulation and budgetary constraints
in the analysis of alternative policy objectives are, in the writer's
opinion, essential elements to arrival at a preferred policy decision
109
under conditions of limited resources.
One final point on this phase of policy formulation concerns
the necessary flexibility of the issued guidance. Feedback from the
subsequent phases of formulation may indicate the necessity for changes
in either policy or resource constraints. The policymaking system
should allow for interaction and generation of revisions in guidelines
when warranted.
The next phase in policy formulation is the detailed analysis
of policy and resource guidance to identify the key issues and goals
(Chart 8). Different issues will be found in varying stages of develop-
ment, and the system should have the flexibility to begin the analysis
at any point. The Chief Executive frequently will state specific policy
goals, and even ocasionally will formulate explicit short term objec-
tives he wishes to see implemented. When the guidance is more in the
form of a general concept or attitude, however, it becomes necessary
109 The writer is not alone in this contention, and directs the reader
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for long range goals to be developed by an analysis staff; and a
number of alternative objectives must be generated and examined.
Important in the search for preferred alternatives when making
policy decisions is the support of policymaking creativity through
emphasis on development of a number of alternative policy objectives in
support of each goal. These objectives are then subjected to an analysis
process in order to determine feasibility and preferability of their
selection. Continuous throughout this development of the preferred
set of policy objectives is feedback to all earlier phases of policy
formulation. If objectives are generally infeasible for budgetary
reasons, additional resources may be requested. If the problem lies
in acceptability of the objective within the planning environment,
requests for elaboration on policy guidance may be forwarded.
As explained in the preceding chapter, analysts should have
high quality substantive information which is available immediately
on request. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques will
be used throughout this stage of policy formulation, and this writer
sees the need for analytic tools and requisite data bases in easily
retrievable storage systems, such as computerized on-line facilities.
Once the set of feasible, preferable policy objectives has
been developed, this product is then submitted for final approval by
Department principals. Such approval is justification for the next
phase of policymaking, the implementation phase, to begin.
4. Policy Implementation Stage
The implementation phase of the policymaking system carries
form the specific statement of policy objectives through the develop-
ment and activation of programs designed to achieve those objectives




^ Develop New Obj ectives
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The development of alternative programs for a stated objective
depends on whether the statement of that objective is operational or
more abstract. It has been the writer's experience that policy objec-
tives are frequently narrow and operationally oriented, with the
objective statement and program statement almost one in the same. If
the objective calls for "training a fixed number of co-op managers in
Country A," then the program must be one for training co-op managers.
If the objective is more general, such as "to increase grain yeilds by
five per cent in Country B," than a range of possible programs could be
effective. It is possible, in the latter case, that the optimal arrange-
ment might include a combination of programs, such as planting a fixed
acreage with improved seeds, supporting research and testing of special
grain varieties, agricultural education programs and distribution of
production credits. The selection of one or all of these alternatives
is an analytical process that must assess first feasibility and then
preferability of programs.
The point must be made that this development of alternative
program possibilities, and the assessment of and selection from this
set of alternatives, can be no less important than the selection of
policy objectives in the formulation stage. The strategic level
analysis of goals and objectives, and the cost figures generated to
110
support this analysis, cannot reflect accurate amounts. The degree
of uncertainty at the strategy level renders these figures useful only
in the relative sense of selecting among alternatives at that same
level. The costing of specific programs such as the agricultural
programs mentioned above, that are to be implemented should be much








CD <m •H P 1





H ro cd SP > CD
Cd CD CD-P
E faOvH w








•H ^\Cm P rf\
O cd cVt\
M-P M \
CD CD o 1








Action Programs Not Feasible/Preferable
90

exacting, and errors can be quite costly in forcing reallocation of
resources to cover unforeseen cost overruns. The need for careful
analysis and cost estimation is equally as great in getting programs
to the operating level as it is in the initial selection of policy
objectives.
In Chapter III the point was made that implementation of policy
programs should, if at all possible, be carried out at the Country
Team level. It is clear that the initial stages of implementation,
where program options are developed and evaluated and preferable
programs are selected, will be characterized by much interaction among
area, functional and country staffs. Once the final decisions are made
concerning which programs to institute where, the writer feels that the
Country Teams should be best qualified to carry through the programs.
Familiarity with the local situation, personal contacts of CT members,
formal authority of the Chief-of-Mission and continuity of staffing
are all advantages of decentralizing policy implementation and opera-
tions to the CT level.
Creating a particular program's structure in a host country
requires all of the above areas of expertise and more. Since program
operation can vary from a one-man negotiating function up to a major
educational, agricultural or contracted construction effort, program
activation can be quite a complex task. It may be necessary to develop
specialized processes or techniques in one of these or other fields.
It will surely be necessary to secure and train personnel in varied
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This writer feels that it would be must easier to augment the Country
Team with the requisite specialists than to dispatch a special project
unit to the host country in the semi-autonomous role of implementing
foreign policy programs.
5. Policy Operations Stage
Once implementation has progressed to the point where major
revisions in program structure and activities are no longer being made,
operational guidelines can be established and the operations stage
begins (Charts 12 and 13). Operations are the ends toward which the
policy implementation functions were directed, and the routine conduct
of these activities should be the most effective approach the manager
112
could find for attaining a particular policy objective. The whole
purpose of the "formulation—implementation—operations" process flow
is to retain the policymaking continuity from initial concept through
to activity, attempting to avoid faulty suboptimization while dividing
the policymaking processes into segments that can be managed effectively.
In the operations stage, constraints are specific; and managerial
efforts are primarily directed toward achieving economy and efficiency
in the use of resources. Fixed operational procedures are established
and conduct of the various program activities becomes routinized.
Analysis is more highly quantified and specific, and stress is placed
on collection of operational data and reporting. Where in the earlier
113
112 Ibid.
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phases of the policymaking process the emphasis was on ideas and con-
cepts, the operations phase is primarily concerned with the economic or
efficient achievement of tasks. The manager's analysis capability
assists him in selecting the operational modes he finds preferred
within his constraint boundaries.
A major operations function that supports all four stages of
policymaking is the continued collection and storage of operational
data. This data travels through primary feedback channels into the
policy analysis functions at all levels, as well as into storage in
the information storage and retrieval system. In the policy design
and control phase, the data provides the base for "learning feedback,"
used to evaluate and restructure the overall policymaking system. At
other points it becomes the immediate feedback input into analysis of
program alternatives and even supports the more esoteric analyses con-
ducted in the formulation phase. This data collection provides the
raw material necessary to feed a dynamic policymaking process, con-
tinuously in a state of transition and development.
B. THE MODEL AND REALITY
At this point in the thesis, the writer has examined and critiqued
existing systems for policymaking at the Department of State, developed
his own characteristics for a preferred policymaking system, and pro-
posed a model of the phases and elements necessary to the policymaking
process for the foreign affairs community. Now the obvious question
is how does this model relate to the real situation?
The writer believes that this model relates quite well to the
situation he has observed over the past year. The reader must under-
stand, however, just what has been presented. First observe what this
96

model is not . The numerous charts do not define a specific hierarchical,
behavioral or functional organization structure. Neither does the model
represent an algorithm or methodology for policymaking.
The model does show phases and elements that the writer feels are
essential to the development of a preferred policymaking process, a
process that operates in such a manner that the preferred alternatives
(goals, objectives, programs) are developed and selected. The model
proposes elements and phases of a process that will develop a policy-
making structure and methodologies. The model offers the elements of
a cybernetic process to insure the system continuously grows and adapts
to its environment.
A policy develops from its initial concept through to policy action
in the three substantive management stages: formulation, implementa-
tion and operations. At a given moment, the formulation of policy goals
and objectives may be taking place at the Department's seventh floor'
level, implementation may be in process at the regional bureau level,
and policy operations may be conducted by a country team. However, this
is not the only case. The Under Secretary of State may be performing
in all three stages simultaneously. He may be formulating goals and
objectives for a Department manpower reduction, implementing a Presi-
dential directive to establish a commission on narcotics traffic, and
operating his own office staff. An ambassador may be involved in policy
formulation for his host country or his region, while also implementing
and operating other policy objectives and programs. With the proposed
model, this same pattern holds at every level.
The proposed process requires analyses to be performed in all three
substantive management stages, to assist the policymakers toward valid




evaluation. The CASP system required a rigid methodology for policy
selection at the country level, without commensurate prior regional and
global level analyses. As explained in Chapter II, the criteria for
the lower level suboptimizations could not be effectively aggregated
into regional plans, as the constraints had not been given at the out-
set. The proposed model anticipates and guides the development of
methodologies in each of the three substantive management stages,
offering a degree of homogeneity to policy development through these
stages. The writer foresees that his process would cause most strategic
planning (formulation) mechanisms to be established at the senior
executive or seventh floor and regional bureau levels, most implementa-
tive mechanisms at regional bureau and country team levels, and most
operations control mechanisms at the country or mission level.
Much of the function of the proposed system design, development
and control stage would likely be performed by an analysis staff located
at the seventh floor level, and removed from the hassle of day-to-day
operations. This would rule out the current Planning and Coordination
Staff and probably require development of a new staff entity at that
level. Some of the system development and control functions could be
assumed by analysis staffs at regional and country levels, but the
writer anticipates that these staffs would be more intimately involved
in the current policy analysis phases of policymaking. This new
seventh floor staff would take on more the aspect of a "think tank,"
and concern itself with the development and advancement of the policy-
making system. It has been one of the writer's principal objectives
11
4
See the criterion discussion in section C of this chapter.

to show the need for and develop a concept of this system-oriented
stage, performing the function of "policymaking on how to make policy."
The purpose of the model, then, is to describe (prescribe) a process
which contains elements and phases of policymaking that the writer con-
siders essential to development of a preferred system, elements which
are not always considered in the structuring of such systems. The
model then becomes a conceptual frame for the development of the
specific organizational structure and analysis methodologies.
C. EFFECTIVENESS MEASUREMENT
1. Concept
Policymaking in foreign affairs is an interactive process
which continually involves choice among alternatives. The alternatives
may be strategic policy goals, objectives to achieve those goals, or
programs designed to attain the objectives. Whatever the level of
aggregation, the general problem of choice is essentially the same.
In order to choose among alternatives, a way to
estimate or predict the various consequences of their
selection must exist. This may be as elementary as
calling on the intuition of a single expert, but the
more formal process of using a model or set of models
usually leads to better results.H
5
In addition to the requirement to estimate the consequences of
alternatives, there must be a way to relate or compare them, a "criterion"
for the construction of an"effectiveness scale."
A third element, which may or may not be incorporated into the
above, is a "standard" to measure from. The standard can give impor-
tant properties to the effectiveness scale, depending on how it is
5 e.S. Quade, "Principles and Procedures of Systems Analysis," in
Quade and W.I. Boucher, Systems Analysis and Policy Planning : Applica-
tions in Defense (Santa Monica: The RAM) Corporation) 1968, p. M2.
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applied. It can require a minimum level of performance for each alterna-
tive (survival level), offer a performance target or goal, or simply
express the level of past performance for purposes of comparison.
In the writer's research, most descriptions of effectiveness
measurement were built around hardware examples, in which the effective-
ness scales were constructed of common physical units that provided
their own implicit standards, such as miles per hour, rounds per minute,
lethal radius and so on. It is the writer's opinion that in policy-
making the standards must be made explicit, due to both the ambiguous
character of some of the measures and the possible invalid useage of
certain standards. As Dror's example shows, there is:
...the possibility that, despite higher achievements
than in the past, the organization may be worse off
when evaluated by significant outside standards. ... A
hospital that how heals 70 per cent of patients with
a certain disease, and that healed only 45 per cent in
the past, may have become less efficient if in the
past only 48 per cent of the. patients could possibly
be cured, but now, with modern medicine, 85 per cent
could be .116
Before this discussion of effectiveness measurement proceeds,
there are a number of terms that should be defined.
Model : A model is a representation of reality which abstracts
the features of the situation relevant to the question
being studied. H7
The role of the model in systems analysis is to provide
a way to obtain cost and performance estimates for each
alternative .11
8
lib QTOr> ojd. cit
. , pp. 28-29-
117 E. S. Quade, "Introduction," in Quade and Boucher, op_. cit .
,
pp. 5^-55.
118 Quade, op_. cit., p. 42.
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Criterion : A criterion is a rule... for ranking the alternatives
in order of desirability and indicating the most
promising. -^
Effectiveness Scale : Scale indicating degrees of achievement,
related to a particular criterion.
Effectiveness : Position on the effectiveness scale assigned to
each alternative.
Standard : Tool for appraising; or grading the ascertained level
of effectiveness. 121
The writer believes that adaptation of the above definitions to
the evaluation process in policymaking removes much of the ambiguity
inherent in the unquantifiable aspects of choosing among alternatives.
The criterion is used to develop an effectiveness scale. The degrees
of predicted or actual achievement for each alternative are expressed
on the scale as that alternatives level of effectiveness. Then the
standard is applied to assist in identifying which, if any, of the
alternatives might be preferred.
An example might aid to clarify the above process. The long-
range goal is to raise the literacy rate in Country X by five per cent
in a five-year period. One of the selected objectives is to reduce the
primary school dropout rate by ten per cent over the next two years.
Alternative programs being considered are: 1) Construct additional
classrooms on existing schools; 2) Construct additional schools in
outlying areas; 3) provide additional teachers for outlying areas; and
4) provide personal incentives (tuition programs, tax reductions) for
families who keep their children in school.




120 Effectiveness and effectiveness scale adapted from: L. D. Attaway,




Adapted from: Dror, op_. cit., p. 58.
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In this example, the criterion will be the primary school drop-
out rate, using grades one through six. The effectiveness scale will
measure this drop-out rate. The effectiveness of each alternative
will be determined by the predicted/actual drop-out rate resulting
from imployment of that alternative alone. The standard vail be the
planned target of ten percent reduction in primary school drop-out rate
over a two-year period.
The two principal uses of effectiveness measures in this example
are to decide which alternative programs to employ and to evaluate those
programs once they are operational. The writer realizes that there may
be interactions among the alternatives being considered. The combina-
tion of construction and teacher training may together provide a much
higher return than the sum of the two applied separately, or one might
be a constraint upon the other. These are considerations that must be
weighed by 'the policy analyst when he is formulating his model, and he
may take them into account at the risk of the model becoming too complex
to manipulate.
The preceding point requires the clarification of two concepts:
first, what is a model; and secondly, what is the effect of the iterative
nature of the process on selection of alternatives.
A model was defined earlier as "a representation of reality
which abstracts the features of the situation relevent to the question
being studied." In this definition there is no requirement that a model
122
be particularly mathematical, computerized, or even analytical. ' A
-^^ A comprehensive introduction to types of models may be found in:





scenario may be a model as well as a set of differential equations.
One model presented in this section is that primary school drop-out
rate in Country X may be influenced by the four alternative programs
being considered. As the analysis proceeds, each of these alternative
programs must be costed by constructing a "cost model," which vail
examine the amounts of resources necessary to accomplish the proposed
tasks. (Costs are usually interpreted as opportunities foregone or
"opportunity costs.") To summarize, a number of models may be used by
a policy analyst in reaching a decision. The only difference advocated
in the evaluation process being outlined is that the analyst make the
model explicit rather than implicit.
The second concept to be expanded is the nature of the iterative
process in selection of alternatives. Going back to the example, it was
mentioned that there was a possibility of interaction among the alterna-
tives, with the possibility of producing some hybrid combination. One
possibility not mentioned was that data collection might cause a
previously unconsidered alternative to surface. A survey of the rural
areas, to gather data for evaluating the four proposed alternatives,
might show that a major impediment to keeping children in school is
the need for their addition to the farm labor force during critical
planting and harvest periods. If the school year presently includes
these periods, a new alternative might be the revision of the class
schedule to conform to the needs of the people. Both examples, the
construction of a hybrid alternative and the addition of a new alterna-
tive, could be incorporated into the model; and the new set of alterna-
tives could be evaluated. The same interation might have shown one
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of the other alternatives, e.g. tax incentives to be of negligible
value. This alternative, then would be dropped from the model.
2. Criteria
Now that the subject of effectiveness measurement has been
introduced and the principal terms defined and
.
explained , a closer look
should be taken at the difficulties and complexities of establishing
measurement criteria.
Ideally we should choose that course of action which,
with available resources, maximizes something like the
"satisfaction" of an individual, the profits of a firm,
the "military worth" of the military establishment, or
the "well being" of a group .... Then we would pick the
policy that promised to yield the most satisfaction, the
most profits, the most military worth, or the most well
being. ... We do not have the ability to translate out-
comes into such terms. In practical problem-solving,
therefore, we have to look at some "proximate" criterion
which serves to reflect what is happening to satisfaction
or military worth. Actual criteria are the practicable
substitutes for the maximization of whatever we would
ultimately like to maximize .123
As Charles J. Hitch and Roland McKean point out, analysis can-
not be expressed in terms of esoteric values. The criteria, to be
useable, must be expressed operationally or in some workable manner.
Often this cannot be done at the level or degree of complexity of the
problem. Big problems, then, must be broken into several small problems;
and some of the variables must be held constant in order to make the
problem manageable. Hitch and McKean go on to say:
It is inevitable that decision-making be broken into
pieces. The division is almost necessarily along
hierarchical lines, some of the broader policy choices
being made by high level officials or groups, others
being delegated to lower levels.






Similarly, analyses must be piece-meal, since it is
impossible for a single analysis to cover all problems
of choice simultaneously in a large organization. 12^
The above discussion introduces the concepts expressed by the two terms
suboptimization and aggregation, and opens a new area of possible dif-
ficulty in the evaluation problem.
Attaway defines suboptimization as "... fixing certain character-
istics that might, in fact, vary...." ^ In terms of the earlier example,
the goal of raising Country X's literacy rate was broken into several
manageable pieces, one of which was the reduction of primary school
drop-out rate. Optimization of this objective is a suboptimization of
the larger goal. The goal itself is a suboptimization of a functionally
vague concept such as education or quality of life. Going the other
direction, our objective was divided into programs, such as school and
classroom construction. Once adopted, these programs will be further
divided into elements, perhaps phasing the classroom construction
program by regions or by prioritizing the areas of greatest need.
Suboptimizing to gain understanding and manageability of problems
is recognized as a necessary technique. The problem of dividing the
goals, objectives or programs, however, becomes quite complex when
criteria are considered. Attaway goes on to say:
Suboptimization permits the design of various components...
to be fixed. They can then be represented by a single
over-all component ... that is, we can "aggregate" compon-
ents into larger systems. Without this ability to
aggregate, we could not study problems embracing many
components. . . .126
12^ ibid,







The major problem in aggregation is the criteria problem. As various
levels of suboptimization are employed, the analyst must continually
check to see that the lower level criteria do not conflict with those
used in the higher levels of aggregation. As Hitch and McKean stress,
. . . there is a real danger in piecemeal analysis , one
whose importance must be reemphasized because it is
probably not as widely appreciated as are the dif-
ficulties inherent in biting off too big a chunk of
the problem. The danger is that the criteria adopted
in lower level problems may be unrelated to and in-
consistent with the higher level criteria. As men-
tioned before, proximate criteria have to be used in
any case; but since problems must be considered one
piece at a time, a whole hierarchy of proximate
criteria comes into play, and potential inconsisten-
cies are abundant .1^7
To go back to our example of raising the literacy rate in Country X,
it might be faulty to use the number of teachers trained as a criterion,
not knowing whether they would go to the areas of need or even stay in
the country. In the Republic of Viet Nam in 1965-66, programs to train
doctors had little effect on the availability of doctors in the rural
areas because, once educated, the doctors remained in the population
1 oR
centers where they received much higher pay for their services.
The problems with criterion selection presented in this section
only scratch the surface. Each task facing the policy analyst is unique,
and only he can know the many difficulties he will encounter in develop-
ing valid measurement criteria. There is extensive literature on the
subject, however, and the reader may find it useful to examine the major
129problem areas encountered by others.
127




12a personal experience as adviser in Viet Nam.
129 See: Hitch and McKean, op_. cit
., pp. 158-181; L. D. Attaway,
op. cit.
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The treatment here of standards will be brief and geared to the
identification of some of the problems that may be met in their selec-
tion. A standard was defined earlier as a "tool for appraising or
grading the ascertained level of effectiveness." It provides an anchor
point for the effectiveness scale, a point to measure from, and in some
cases a minimum acceptable level or "survival quality" measure.
Dror identifies seven main standards for grading the quality of
policymaking: "(1) post quality; (2) quality of other systems; (3)
desired quality; (4) professional standards of quality; (5) survival
quality; (6) planned quality; and (7) optimal quality." ^ The writer
does not intend to examine each of these standards as the breakdown
is arbitrary and they are discussed in detail in Dror's book. Dror
contends that the only valid standard in all cases is "optimal quality,"
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and uses his argument as a lead-in to his "optimal model" concept.
It is the writer's contention that selection of a standard has most of
the possible pitfalls found in criterion selection, and that any of
the above categorizations may be valid or invalid depending on the
particular case.
In the literacy rate example presented earlier, the criterion
for measuring attainment of the goal was "literacy rate," and the
standard was a desired quality of five per cent inprovement in five
years. If research shows that literacy rate is climbing already at a
rate equivalent to or in excess of the standard, then the standard may
be faulty. This exposes a problem of setting standards that would be





131 Ibid., pp. 67-69. 10?

Other problems may be found in the areas of standards which
reflect improvement over time or advancements over existing systems.
A particular program may show great improvement over previous efforts,
but still remain below survival quality. Dror hypothesizes a case
where
:
...although an air defense system has tripled its capacity
to intercept enemy missiles from x to 3x, it may now be
in more danger than ever if, in the meantime the enemy's attack
capacity has increased from x-n to 3x + m.132
Standards should be selected along with the criteria, and both
used to construct the effectiveness scale. Both are subject to changes
which may be initiated by the questioning and reexamining aspects of
the iterative analysis process. Standards, as criteria, are not immut-
able in the evaluation process, and may change on the basis of evidence
that they are or have become invalid. In the end, it is the policy .
analyst who must monitor the dynamJ.cs of several levels of criteria
and standards, and insure that necessary changes are made.
4. Cost-Effectiveness
Since the concept of "cost" was considered to be more familiar
to the reader and past experience in foreign affairs programming was
concentrated in "costing" alternatives, the writer has focussed the
discussion of evaluation on effectiveness measurement . This does
not in any way reduce the importance of cost considerations. As pointed
out in Chapters II and III, this writer considers the lack of a linkage
between cost and effectiveness to be a major shortcoming of past foreign
affairs programming efforts. It is the writer's opinion, however, that
132 Ibid., p. 29.
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much of this linkage difficulty was due to inadequate or non-existant
measures of effectiveness. Cost and effectiveness must be brought to-
gether to complete the evaluation process.
In comparison of alternatives, there are two principal conceptual
approaches: 1) fixed effectiveness , where a specified level of effec-
tiveness is set and the analysis is used to minimize the necessary costs
to achieve it; and 2) fixed budget , where for a specified cost the
analysis is used to select the alternatives that give the highest effec-
tiveness. 33 The example used throughout this section shows instances
where either approach may be used. The standard of ten per cent reduc-
tion in primary school drop-out rate may, If considered important
enough, be taken as a fixed effectiveness level; and the alternative(s)
selected will achieve that standard at the lowest cost. On the other
hand, the standard may be used simply as a target, and a fixed budget
may be allotted for the purpose. The point to be emphasized Is that
cost should be related to effectiveness in one of these manners.
It is not the writer' s purpose to begin a detailed discussion
of how to cost the alternatives being considered. At least one entire
volume has been devoted to this subject. 3 The concept of marginal
costs should, however, be explained. "Marginal costs are those costs
1SSincurred as we make marginal changes in a program." ->J Related to our
example of building additional schools in outlying areas of Country X,
the marginal costs could be the costs of each additional school; and
"-33 Fisher , op. cit
., p. 10.




the commensurate increase in effectiveness achieved by adding each
school would be one way a policy analyst could array his data for use
by the decisionmaker.
It is the writer's opinion that such an incremental approach
to analysis particularly lends itself to foreign policy, and is useable
in cases where the decisionmaker's alternatives cannot be related to
the same criterion. Take an expanded version of our much-used example.
The goal is to raise literacy rate. One objective is lowering primary
school drop-out rates. Another might be the expansion of adult educa-
tion programs to slum areas, with a criterion in terms of numbers who
graduate a basic adult education program. Although the criteria for
these two objectives are not equivalent, the decisionmaker can view
their response to a marginal increase in program funding, and should
be better able to make his decision.
This discussion of effectiveness measurement in policy analysis
has only scratched the surface. Its purpose has been to support the
author' s contention that such measures can be applied in an area where
the problems being considered cannot be quantified in any direct manner
and involve a great deal of subjective judgment. A remark by M. M.
Lavin of RAND best expresses the author's feelings at this point.
No individual or organization can hope to be objective.
They can, however, be honest in identifying and dis-
playing their bias. The notion that big decisions can
be an automatic consequence of the application of mathe-
matical models, cost-effectiveness analysis, or computer
simulation belongs to that dreadful era when science-
fiction writers, including some on the editorial page of
the N. Y. Times , were heralding the advent of "push-button"
warfare (in some instances with the buttons being pushed
by computers). 3






Having completed a long passage and possibly offending on route some
of those persons the writer wanted to encourage, if not help, he wishes
to recall his purposes. First, it was his intent to propose a conceptual
framework for policymaking in foreign affairs, recognizing that others
will supply specific techniques and methodologies.
Secondly, the writer tried to look at the whole of America's foreign
affairs, yet keep the perspective of those individuals involved in par-
ticular facets of policymaking. The attempt has been to identify and
design processes and relationships that must be considered in a future
overall system as well as examine the benefits and applications they
will have for practicioners at varying levels.
It is the writer's contention that the new frontier for systems
analysis is its application to the field of policy sciences and that
this frontier will be the most challenging for policymakers and their
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